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Summary 
This paper begins by reviewing the different meanings given to the concept of “the social” within the 
development policy discourse over the past half century in order to delineate the domain of “social policy” 
in the context of developing countries. This review suggests that the “social” dimensions of public policy 
relate to those aspects which bear on how societies reproduce themselves at different levels: at the micro-
level of individuals and their capabilities; at the meso level of institutions and social relations; and at the 
macro level of the societal structures of production and reproduction. Institutions are critical within this 
understanding of “social policy” because they mediate the processes by which societies translate the 
resources at their disposal into the individual and societal outcomes which are of interest to policy-makers.  
The paper develops an analytical framework organised around the concepts of institutions and 
institutional access in order to explore the factors which help to explain the experience of different 
countries in their attempts to translate economic resources into social outcomes. The paper suggests that, 
while variations in performance reflect a range of historical, political and economic factors, ideological 
adherence to either state-centred or market-driven approaches to social need have in the past prevented 
consideration of policy options more tailored to the pattern of local need, particularly the needs of poor 
and excluded groups. In practice, social need has been met in diverse ways by diverse groups so that the 
reality on the ground has been one of welfare pluralism. Managing this pluralism from a citizen-centred 
perspective offers a promising route to a more inclusive social policy for the future. The paper concludes 
by considering what some of the elements of such an approach might be.  
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1  Introduction: the problem of boundaries in policy discourse 
In 1998, the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex together with partner institutions in Bangladesh and 
India (from the South Asian region), China (from the East Asian region) and Malawi (from Southern 
Africa) embarked on a DFID-funded programme of research on social policy issues in the context of 
development.1 Figure 1.1 summarises the basic themes of the research that we proposed to carry out. It 
spelt out our intended focus on basic human capabilities and livelihood security and drew attention to the 
range of institutional actors, global as well as local, likely to be involved in shaping patterns of social 
provisioning in different contexts. The idea of “social provisioning”, as it will be used in this paper, refers 
very simply to the sum total of activities by which people take care of themselves and plan for their future 
(Elson 1998). Our decision to focus on human capabilities and livelihood security as key aspects of social 
provisioning was intended to reflect our concerns with issues of poverty and social exclusion in low-
income countries. However, we started from the premise that such concerns did not exhaust the domain 
of social policy. The point of departure for the proposed research was to investigate the value-added of a 
social policy perspective to the current poverty reduction agenda. 
This required us to confront very early on in developing our research agenda the question that all 
researchers on social policy have to address at some stage in their work: what is “social” about social 
policy and how does it differ from “economic” policy (Kabeer and Cook 2000). As Elson (2000) points 
out, one of the problems with establishing the boundaries between the two lies in the fact that “the 
economic” and “the social” are not abstract dualities: people do not live their lives in separate domains, 
distinct aspects of which can be labelled “economic” and “social” (p1). While her point applies to people’s 
lives across the world, it has particular resonance for those areas of the developing world where economic 
life continues to be embedded within, and governed in important ways by, non-market relationships. The 
boundaries between “the economic” and “the social” are far more blurred in these contexts because so 
many activities that are conventionally described as “economic” in mainstream economics are carried out 
through relationships that have been conventionally cast as “non-economic”. This is in marked contrast to 
processes of production in advanced capitalist economies where the defining institutional feature has been 
the emergence of a distinct, and dominant, sphere of market relations, attempts to regulate which by the 
state on behalf of its citizens have given rise to a distinct set of “social” policies.  
This takes us to the second aspect of the problem of boundary definition: the origins of social policy 
discourse. As Baltodano (1999) has pointed out, the very concept of social policy is intimately linked with 
a specific historical process – the evolution of modern Western societies along a capitalist trajectory and 
the perceived need for policy interventions to protect the working population from the vagaries of the 
market place. Much of the existing literature on social policy in developing countries has drawn on this 
experience and reproduced its concepts, frameworks and instruments in contexts which are characterised 
by very different institutional configurations. In some cases,  this has led to the conceptualisation  of social 
                                                           
1  The partners were the Jawarlahal Nehru University, India, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 
Centre for Social Research at the University of Malawi and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, China. 
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policies in extremely narrow terms, dictated by professional concerns with social work or bureaucratic 
demarcation of sectors. These have failed to take account of the inter-connected nature of people’s lives, 
particularly in the context of subsistence or only partially commodified economies, a problem that will be 
discussed later in the paper.  
On the other hand, attempts to transfer broad conceptual frameworks developed in the context of 
advanced industrialised economies to the conditions that prevail in the poorer countries of the south are 
beset with their own problems. Examples of this are illustrated by recent attempts to transfer the “welfare 
regime” typology developed by Esping-Anderson for the European context to a number of “southern” 
countries (1990; see, for instance, Gough 2001; Davis 2001; Barrientos 2001). The usefulness of a 
framework developed to capture the “path-dependent” evolution of social policy in the relatively similar 
societies of Europe to the extremely different, and highly differentiated, societies which make up the 
global south is in any case highly questionable It is rendered even more problematic in the context of an 
increasingly globalised world, where the rapid transfer of ideas and policies across national boundaries, 
most recently through the imposition of structural adjustment programmes by the international financial 
institutions, continually disrupts the possibilities of “path-dependence” which characterised the evolution 
of institutional arrangements in an earlier and more stable era.  
Furthermore, concepts and frameworks have a degree of “path-dependence” of their own. They 
have evolved within specific contexts and the insights they have to offer are likely to be shaped – and 
limited – by that context. There is consequently a real danger that reliance on concepts and constructs 
developed in the context of advanced industrialised countries to investigate the problems facing poorer 
southern countries will produce an account which fails to capture the unique challenges of economic 
growth, poverty reduction and human development which face them today. Finally, while the gender-
blindness of the original formulation of the welfare regimes approach has been rectified in subsequent 
formulations, it remains an approach in which the “care economy” and unpaid work are “added on” 
rather than central to the analysis.2 
For these reasons, we rejected both “social sectors” and “welfare regimes” as appropriate 
frameworks for our analysis. Instead, we decided to take the “sustainable livelihoods” (SL) framework as 
our starting point. This was developed precisely to address the conditions prevailing in poorer southern 
countries (Chambers 1995; Scoones 1998; Carney 1998; Carney et al. 1999; Ellis 2000) and appeared better 
equipped to address the challenges these conditions posed for development policy. However, the 
framework had to be considerably modified to serve our purpose. First of all, the idea of “sustainability” 
carries a number of different meanings in the development discourse. Growth-oriented models of 
development use it to imply the generation of the economic surpluses necessary to sustain some desired 
level of development effort. Environmentalists have drawn attention to the need to conserve the natural 
resource basis of the development effort. Our concern, on the other hand, was with “social sustainability”,  
                                                           
2  Sainsbury (1999), for instance, argues that the Nordic welfare state model described by Esping-Andersen is far 
more internally differentiated if gender differences in social policy are taken into account.  
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the extent to which the human capabilities that people brought to bear in meeting their needs and securing 
their livelihoods were renewed and enhanced in the course of development, and across generations. We 
had to reformulate the SL framework to take this into account.  
Secondly, our focus in the research was not on livelihoods per se but on the broader institutional 
configuration of social provisioning which prevailed in different contexts, and with the extent to which it 
addressed the needs of the poor. Within this broader framework, we were particularly interested in the 
interface between institutions of social policy, and the principles of “access” they embodied, and the 
provisioning efforts of the poor, captured by the idea of livelihood strategies. Consequently, the 
SL framework was re-organised to focus on “institutions and access”, with households and their 
“livelihood strategies” forming one strand of the research. The reformulated framework is summarised in 
Figure 1.2 and consists of the following basic components:  
 
Context: The “context” makes up what are referred as “the initial conditions” characterising particular 
development trajectories. It encompasses those aspects of the environment which help to shape and give 
meaning to the observed patterns of social provisioning. History, geography, culture, economy and 
demography all combine to make up the relevant aspects of the environment in which social policies are 
constructed and livelihood strategies devised.  
 
Resources: The resource endowments of a society are a particularly important aspect of the context as far as 
understanding its efforts at social provisioning are concerned. They represent the overall wealth of the 
society as well as the composition of this wealth in terms of human, material and social resources, returns 
to which reflect their relative scarcities in a particular context and access to which would determine its 
patterns of poverty and inequality. 
 
Institutions and access: Institutions refer to distinct clusters of rules, norms and relationships which make up 
a society and which embody distinct principles of “access” (claims, favours, entitlements, rights) to valued 
resources. Institutions mediate the processes by which resources are translated into outcomes. Our 
interest in this paper is with the institutional configurations of social provision in particular societies i.e. 
with the range of different institutions through which societies seek to provide for themselves and with 
the outcomes that they achieve.  
 
Policy regimes: These reflect the collective efforts of a society to intervene in the workings of its institutions 
through purposive policy interventions and to support or re-direct them in particular ways to achieve 
particular goals. 
 
Livelihood strategies are organised around the needs and priorities of different groups of households and 
individuals, and reflect the combination of resources and activities by which these are addressed.  
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Development outcomes: Interactions between structural forces, institutional processes and livelihood strategies 
will determine the extent to which different groups of households and individuals are able to meet their 
needs and priorities. Outcomes at the micro-level interact with institutional processes to form societal 
outcomes which help to determine whether societies reproduce, or transform, themselves over time.  
 
The rest of the paper considers how this basic framework can be used to address social policy concerns in 
the kind of contexts in which our research was conducted. Section 2 discusses the different meanings 
attached to the idea of “the social” within different development discourses over the past half century and 
uses the discussion to demarcate the domain of “the social” in development policy and the kind of outcomes 
that social policy might be concerned with. Section 3 elaborates on the institutional component of the 
livelihoods framework, taking account of differences in the historical trajectories which have given rise to 
differing institutional configurations and of their implications for current processes of social provisioning. 
Section 4 focuses on the policy regimes which prevail in developing country contexts and the social 
outcomes they embody while Section 5 explores the implications of this discussion for the livelihood 
strategies of the poor. Section 6 concludes with some reflections on what social policy for socially-
sustainable development might imply.  
 
2  Defining the domain of “the social” in development policy 
 
2.1 Shifting meanings of “the social” in the development discourse  
In order to obtain a clearer handle on what is meant by the “the social” within the development discourse, 
a review was undertaken of some of the literature associated with the major development conferences of 
the past half century (Kabeer 1999). At first reading, this literature served to confuse, rather than clarify. 
As Thin (1998) points out, the idea of “the social” has been used in a bewildering number of ways in the 
development discourse. In the negative sense it is used to refer to the “residual” (encompassing everything 
that cannot be captured by conventional models of the market or formal political analysis) the 
“pathological” (the product of “unhealthy” processes in society, such as discrimination, exclusion) and the 
“welfarist” (relief of suffering of those unable to help themselves). It has also been used to describe more 
positive aspects of collective life though concepts such as social capital and social integration.  
However, a closer reading of the literature suggested that these shifts in meaning could be read as 
attempts by various researchers, practitioners, governments and international agencies to come to terms 
with the simple basic fact that human beings could not be treated as simply another factor of production, 
as they had been in the early growth-centred models of development, and that development policy had to 
take cognisance of this fact. In other words, shifting meanings of the social begin to make more sense if 
they are seen as contesting views about the nature of development, the place that “people” occupy within 
it and the role of public policy in addressing their needs. Once this is recognised, differences in meanings 
of the social can be sorted in terms of two distinct, but not unrelated, traditions of thought within the 
social sciences, each representing one term in a dichotomous pair (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Meanings of the “social” in development discourse 
 
 
The first meaning of “social” is defined in opposition to “the economic” and used to refer to the “non-
economic” aspects of social reality. This is the sense in which economists have tended to use the idea of 
“the social”, essentially as a residual term to encompass the non-market arenas of life (family and 
community) where the self-seeking and instrumentalist forms of behaviour displayed by “rational 
economic man” within the market place are suspended in favour of behaviour governed by “irrational” 
norms, beliefs and traditions. Attempts to challenge the dichotomy inherent in this view, and the 
secondary status it assigns to “the social”, has given rise to a rich body of literature, stressing the 
complexity and multidimensionality of human behaviour. Cole, for instance, stresses the human capacity 
for self-reflective agency which is missing in economically deterministic views of the human being:  
 
Humans have developed a personal universe, self-consciousness, unequalled in the animal kingdom 
. . . Human sense of self means that we try to understand our past to try to improve the future . . . 
We are able to have a vision of past experience, and replay it to imply a changed, preferred outcome: 
we can choose how to behave (1999: 7).  
 
Appadurai (1989) criticizes the narrow notion of human well-being promoted by money-metric 
approaches to poverty where it is associated with meeting “physiological” basic needs and points to the 
“critical qualitative dimension” which a more enriched view of the human actor would imply:  
 
SOCIAL 
 
Social Formations 
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Atomised Individuals 
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Rational Economic 
Man 
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Multi-dimensional Social 
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Components of this qualitative dimension include: the perception of security in livelihood, the sense 
of freedom from harassment and abuse at home and at work, the feeling of dignity in day-to-day 
transactions, the belief in the reliability of officialdom, the expectation (or lack of it) that life will 
improve for one’s offspring, and so forth ( p. 256).  
 
Finally, Sen’s concept of “human capability” opens up the possibility of exploring forms of human well-
being and agency which cannot be reduced to the pursuit of individual self-interest. The concept of 
capability – which refers to the ability of individuals to achieve valued ways of being and doing – 
encompasses goals and activities which tended to be overlooked in conventional economic analysis: those 
which were important as ends in themselves (of intrinsic value) rather than simply as a means to other 
ends (of instrumental value) and those motivated by a concern for others rather than simply with the self. 
Sen (1987) points to the significance of both “sympathy” and “commitment” in human behaviour as 
evidence of such concerns:  
 
In helping another person, the reduction of the other’s misery may have the effect of making one feel 
– and indeed be – better off. This is a case of an action that can be promoted on the grounds of 
“sympathy” . . . and falls within the area of promotion of one’s own well-being. In contrast, a case of 
commitment is observed when a person decides to do a thing (eg. being helpful to others) despite it 
not being, in the net, beneficial to the agent himself (p. 28).  
 
The influence of this re-working of “the social” on the policy agenda is evident in the growing acceptance 
that multi-dimensional, as opposed to money-metric, approaches are necessary for understanding the 
distribution of well-being and deprivation in a society (Booth et al. 1998). It is also evident in the 
construction of the Human Development Index by the UNDP to complement – and critique – economic 
growth as a measure of development achievements. And finally, it is evident in the gradual displacement 
of the abstract “factors of production”, such as capital and labour, from centre stage in models of 
development by a heterogeneous array of social actors, differentiated by their identities, interests and 
endowments, and exercising differing degrees of voice, influence and agency in shaping development 
outcomes. Men, women and children, adolescents, farmers, casual labour, micro-entrepreneurs, indigenous 
peoples, the poor, the disabled, the homeless and the socially excluded are some of the members of this 
emergent constituency. 
The second meaning of “the social”, the sense in which sociologists have tended to use the concept, 
is defined in opposition to the idea of the “individual” and refers to the fact that human beings do not 
exist in isolation from each other but within the ensembles of social relationships which make up the 
collective life of the community. Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara (1994) make this point well:  
 
No one goes through life alone. All of us are created within, and influenced by, networks of social 
relations which provide us with our identity and establish a framework for our actions. We survive 
and pursue our goals within a structure of institutions ranging from our families or households, clans 
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or neighbourhoods or communities (where we seek primary support and protection), to the schools, 
associations, street gangs or video parlours (in which we are trained); and the smallholdings, 
plantations, factories, sweatshops, stores and offices (in which we work). On a more general level, 
our opportunities or life chances are affected by larger political and economic structures ranging from 
tribal councils or municipal governments to the nation state, and from non-monetary exchange 
relations among friends to the international financial system (p1).  
 
While this idea of the social has long been accepted in sociology and political economy, it has been given 
fresh life in recent years by various attempts to challenge the growing influence of the methodological 
individualism associated with neo-liberal paradigms of development and the associated stress on market 
forces as the most important, indeed, the sole route for achieving human well-being. Some of this 
challenge has come from within the discipline of economics itself and from economists of both orthodox 
and heterodox persuasions. Sen’s capability approach, for instance, re-inforces this view of “the social” by 
drawing attention to the fact that human well-being and agency are shaped by a far wider set of factors, 
some particular to individuals and others related to the social arrangements that govern their lives, than 
the preoccupation with market forces would suggest. Recent attempts to explore and explain the 
relationship between a country’s GNP and its Human Development Index have helped to draw attention 
to the role of public policy as one of the factors shaping how effectively countries are able to translate 
their economic resources into human development.  
Other examples of attempts to challenge, or at least moderate, the methodological individualism of 
orthodox economics can be found in the emergence of “institutions” and “norms” as frameworks for the 
analysis of individual behaviour (North 1990; Knight 1992) and in various attempts to re-conceptualise 
institutions in terms of the dynamic interplay between norms, relationships, identities and interests rather 
than as functionalist solutions to problems of coordination (Bardhan 1989; Hodgson 1988; Folbre 1994; 
Elson, 1998). It can also be found in the growing attention given to issues of “trust” for the development 
of markets (Platteau 1992), the role of “social capital” in the effective mobilisation of resources (Das 
Gupta and Serageldin 1999), the problems generated by social exclusion (IILS 1996) and the importance 
of social integration as a development goal in its own right (UNRISD 1995, 2000).  
 
2.2 Defining the domain of social policy: reproduction of individuals, capabilities 
and societal structures  
Our re-reading of the development literature thus suggests that different ideas about “the social” can be 
mapped along two axes of meaning: “the social” as opposed to “the economic” and “the social” as 
opposed to “the individual”. Taken together, they define the social dimensions of development as a 
concern with human beings as actors rather than simply another “factor” or “means of production” , and 
moreover, as actors who are embedded in social relationships rather than existing in isolation from each 
other. These meanings resonate closely with ideas about social reproduction in the social sciences, ideas 
which also focus attention on human beings, their capacity for agency, and the social relationships through 
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which human lives and human capabilities are realised, but which, in addition, draw attention to processes 
of continuity and change with which policy is by definition centrally concerned (see, for instance, Edholm 
et al. 1977). A discussion of these different dimensions of social reproduction (summarised in Figure 2.2) 
will help to clarify the “social” aspects of development policy and its articulation with its “economic” 
aspects. It will also help to explain why the “boundaries” between the two are not always clear cut.  
 
Figure 2.2 Conceptualising reproduction: the domain of “the social” 
 
 
The first dimension of social reproduction relates to the reproduction of human beings, both the biological 
aspects of this process – birth, breastfeeding and daily physiological survival – as well as its social aspects – 
their care and maintenance at socially acceptable levels. While the reproduction of human beings may 
entail productive activities in the sphere of the market place (the purchase of food, for instance) or 
reliance on state provision (public health care), the fact that a great deal of the labour involved was, and 
continues to be, carried out by women as unpaid work within the domestic domain and in response to 
affective rather than instrumental considerations means that this is an aspect of human activity which is 
most likely to be excluded from the domain of what is conventionally thought of as “economic”.  
By extension, policies which deal with these activities, or with the relationships through which they 
are carried out, are most clearly seen to belong to the domain of “social” policy. These would include 
public assistance to those who are unable to meet their basic needs through “private” efforts within the 
family, community or market place; health and family planning services; provision of child care and care of 
the elderly and so on. They would also include laws and policies which act on intra-familial relationships, 
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such as those relating to marriage, inheritance and adoption, as well as the relationships between the family 
and the rest of society (eg. employment policies premised on specific assumptions about the nature of 
breadwinning/caring role within the family). 
A second dimension of social reproduction refers to the reproduction of labour, and of the labour force, in a 
society. We are referring here to the activities and processes through which the human capabilities of 
those who contribute to productive and reproductive activities within a society are replenished and 
enhanced over time. Capabilities include both the capacity for physical labour as well as cognitive capacity, 
including the capacity for self-reflective agency, openness to new ideas, creativity, willingness to take risk 
and so on. The relationship between “economic” and “social” policies is more blurred here because 
measures to promote human capabilities have both intrinsic value, because they enhance the ability of 
human beings to realise their full potential, as well as instrumental value, because they enhance the 
productivity of their labour efforts. Thus public policies which seek to promote health facilities at work to 
protect workers’ rights might be perceived as a form of “social” policy, but as “economic” policy if the 
goal is to reduce worker absenteeism. The expansion of access to education may be perceived as “social” 
policy if it is intended to empower socially excluded groups and “economic” policy if the goal is to 
increase the productivity of labour.  
Finally, the third dimension of social reproduction – reproduction of societal relations – refers to 
continuity and change in the ideological and material conditions which form the basis on which relations 
of production and reproduction within a society are reproduced over time. Material outcomes include the 
division of labour between production and reproduction in a society, the rate of growth of national 
income, its distribution between different sections of the population and sectors of the economy as well as 
the positive and negative “externalities” which result from the inter-connected nature of people’s lives. 
Ideological outcomes relate to continuities and change in norms, values and beliefs about the nature of 
social relationships which make up the society, including those relating to equality, justice and rights. This 
“societal” level of reproduction thus encompasses the various institutional structures and processes 
through which values, information, labour, goods and services flow through society generating outcomes 
which set up the dynamics for change or continuity in different parts of the social system. These structures 
and processes can be seen as constituting the particular regime of social reproduction which characterises 
particular contexts. Given the significance of reproduction as well as production to processes of social 
reproduction, and the ideological and material conditions which they embody, regimes of social 
reproduction are essentially gendered regimes. In particular, the significance attached to reproductive 
activities, and the recognition given to those who carry it out, will have profound implications for 
economic growth and human development outcomes of the society as a whole.  
Since social reproduction in this sense of the term involves the full range of institutional structures 
within a society through which individuals and relationships are maintained or transformed through time, 
it implies a correspondingly broad understanding of “the social” as an aspect of development policy. 
Social policy from this perspective includes not only specific measures and interventions relating to the 
institutions, relations and processes through which human life and human capabilities are reproduced, but 
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also the broad thrust of development policy itself: the nature of the vision which informs it, its 
understanding of the boundaries between “the economic” and “the social” and the range of “imagined 
possibilities” that it lays out.  
Debates about “universal” versus “residual” forms of social provision, workfare versus welfare, 
global versus local labour standards, redistribution with growth versus redistribution through growth, 
population control versus reproductive choice, getting “prices right” versus getting “institutions right”, 
women-in-development versus gender-and-development, all of which have featured in the development 
agenda at various points, are all also debates about different models of social reproduction. They may be 
couched in economic terms, but they are often more significant in their implications for the trajectories of 
social reproduction in a particular context than the more explicit forms of social policy in place. From this 
perspective, “economic” policy is simultaneously “social” policy because it is intended to promote the 
well-being of people, which is the ultimate goal of development, just as much as “social” policy is also 
simultaneously economic policy because it deals with human labour and human capabilities, the key 
factors of production (Kothari 1993; Harriss-White 2000). 
Our approach to “social” policy thus detaches it from its moorings in particular sectors, programmes 
and projects and widens it to encompass the purposive efforts made by a range of public actors in a 
society, guided by some vision of “the social”, to influence the processes by which life, labour and social 
relationships are reproduced within that society. However, within this broader definition, there is no a 
priori reason to expect that the vision of “the social” which informs public policy in particular contexts 
will incorporate some universally agreed set of values, or even values which are shared by all sections 
within that particular society. Social policies express the vision of “the social” subscribed to by those who 
make, or are in a position to influence, policy within a particular society, and it is perfectly possible that 
their vision of the social seeks to construct or reproduce a blatantly unjust social order: the Taliban’s 
gender policies, for instance, in Afghanistan or the apartheid state in South Africa.  
Consequently, while it is relatively simple to describe the social vision embodied in a particular set of 
public policies, it is harder to evaluate it, since judgements about its implications for individual and 
collective well-being will vary according to the standpoint from which these policies are evaluated. Even if 
the standpoint of those affected by the policies in question is taken, rather than those making it, 
judgements are likely to vary between different groups: women in Afghanistan are likely to have assessed 
the Taliban’s attempts to restructure gender relations differently, not only from men, but also from each 
other, depending on their socio-economic class, adherence to orthodox religious beliefs, tribal affiliations 
and so.  
However, while this appears to pose an irresolvable dilemma, it is considerably simplified in the 
context of our research programme, given our declared intention to focus on the needs, priorities and 
interests of poor and socially excluded sections of the population in the countries that we studied. From 
this standpoint, we found a considerable degree of convergence between the vision of “the social good” 
implied by our focus and that spelt out by the various international conventions that the majority of 
countries in the world have signed and ratified: the eradication of poverty, the enhancement of human 
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capabilities, the promotion of gender equality and construction of socially inclusive societies (the 
Millennium Development Goals; CEDAW; the Beijing Platform for Action; the Jomtien Declaration; the 
Copenhagen Declaration; etc).  
These goals, each of which represents the outcome of several decades of struggle by different actors 
at different times over the meaning of the “the social” and its place in development policy, provide a set of 
criteria from which we can evaluate the outcomes of development policy efforts in different countries. 
There are a number of different levels at which this evaluation can be conducted (Figure 2.3). At the 
micro-level, we are concerned with the extent to which policies and programmes assist poor and socially 
excluded individuals and groups within particular societies to meet their needs and secure their livelihoods. 
At the broad societal level, we are concerned with the impact of these policies and programmes on 
patterns of poverty, insecurity, inequality and inclusiveness within a society.  
 
 
 
 
 
Mediating these two levels of outcomes are changes at the institutional level. As the channels through 
which ideas, norms, values and resources are distributed in a society, institutions shape the processes by 
which changes at the structural level are translated into changes at the level of different groups and 
individuals. These micro-level outcomes will in turn, through their impact on institutional rules, norms 
and practices, determine how social relations are reproduced – or transformed – over time. Institutions 
thus help to explain the patterns of access, exclusion and marginalisation which characterise a particular 
society. Policies and programmes can be seen as one aspect of these institutional processes, serving to 
maintain, reinforce or destabilise pre-existing patterns of inequality in a society and hence influence its 
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Figure 2.3 Evaluating policy from a “social” perspective
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processes of social reproduction. Institutions, and the principles of access which they embody, are clearly 
central concepts in our framework and will be the main focus of the next section. In subsequent sections, 
we will go on to consider how an institutional analysis can be used to evaluate the role of public policy as 
well as the efforts of individual households in achieving human development goals. 
 
3  Institutions, access and social provision 
 
3.1 “Historicising” institutions: the emergence of social policy in the European 
context 
At their most abstract, institutions have been defined as ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, ‘. . . the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North 1990: 3). Such rules 
may be formal (eg. written, legally enforceable) or informal (tacit understandings, shared norms) but they 
serve to reduce uncertainty in the wider environment ‘by providing a structure to everyday life’ (1990: 3). 
These abstract rules and norms are translated into the concrete structure of socio-economic life as clusters 
of organisations and associations, each characterised by distinctive patterns of activities and behaviour. 
Institutions thus divide a society into distinct domains. They also classify individuals within these domains 
on the basis of their positioning within specific institutional relationships, a positioning which shapes their 
identities and interests, defines their roles and responsibilities and determines the terms on which they 
obtain, or fail to obtain, “access” to institutional resources, values, authority and, of course, power. Indeed 
a great deal of power in society is exercised by individuals and groups by virtue of the authority associated 
with the positions held within particular sets of institutional relations: by heads of households, for 
instance, tribal chiefs, corporate executives, boards of governors and so on.  
A reading of the contemporary development studies literature suggests that it is dominated by four 
key institutions, what Brett (1999) describes as the “master stereotypes” of development studies. The state 
is seen to embody the logic of regulation, enforcing the rules and procedures which provide the 
governance structure of a society: access to its resources is consequently embodied in state legislation, 
policies and regulations. Markets are organised around a commercial logic, the maximisation of profit, and 
resources distributed on the basis of contract-based entitlements. Civil society and community refers to 
the range of sub-national associations through which members seek to pursue a variety of interests, but 
they are organised around somewhat different principles. The concept of community refers to 
organisational relationships which are based on primordial ties, ascribed membership and allocation of 
resources based on “moral” claims and obligations (caste, tribe, clan, patron-client relationships). Civil 
society organisations, on the other hand, are generally based on principles of voluntarism and the 
distribution of resources according to agreed rules (trade unions, non-governmental organisations, 
professional associations). Finally, kinship and family, usually organised as “households” based on co-
residence and/or shared budgets, are based on ties of blood/marriage/adoption and distribute resources 
and responsibilities in accordance with the claims and obligations embodied in relationships between 
members. Households are the site par excellence of the logic of provisioning: ‘the activity of supplying 
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people with what they need to thrive, including care and concern as well as material goods. At the heart of 
provisioning is looking ahead and making preparations’ (Elson 1998: 207). 
Institutions are, by definition, historical constructs: they give stability to a society because they are 
made up of rules, norms and practices which have evolved over a considerable period of time. 
Consequently, differences in institutional configurations in different contexts are the product of the 
different histories of these contexts. Such differences are a central aspect of the differences between the 
wealthier and the poorer countries of the world. There are, of course, differences within these groups, but 
they pale into insignificance compared to the institutional divide which separates the mature capitalist 
economies of the world, where relations of production have become dis-embedded from those of 
reproduction through the generalised spread of market relations, and those poorer, agrarian economies, 
where production is still significantly geared to subsistence needs and governed by relationships of family, 
kinship and community. Some idea of the differences in social structures across the world can be obtained 
from the tables in Appendix A.1 which compare the structure of the economy and the distribution of the 
labour force between different sectors and forms of employment, including family-based production, 
between different groups of developing countries and those in the OECD.  
Polyani’s analysis of the “great transformation” which gave rise to social policy in the European 
context provides a useful historical standpoint from which to consider the nature of this institutional 
divide and its relevance to social policy in contemporary developing countries. Polyani (1944) points out 
that social life and productive efforts in most pre-capitalist societies were organised along principles of 
self-provisioning, redistribution and reciprocity. Claims to resources were generally grounded in variations 
of the moral economy and served to keep individual self-interest in check. Social relationships were 
characteristically “quasi-permanent”, multi-stranded, non-voluntary and hierarchical arrangements through 
which the disposition of property and other resources was effected. Ownership tended to be a matter of 
divided and overlapping claims to various kinds of access and use, rather than of clear-cut individual 
property rights (Fraser and Gordon 1994). Traditional extended family structures wove a wide range of 
kin, as well as other members of the community, into face-to-face networks of claims and obligations. 
The “great transformation” refers to the structural changes which occurred in the European context 
as its societies moved from these “socially-embedded” forms of exchange, regulated by the logic of mutual 
provisioning, to “dis-embedded” market economies, based on impersonal contract-based transactions and 
governed by the logic of profit. The spread of generalised commodity exchange dismantled feudal 
privileges and stripped away the institutional layers of kinship and community which had previously 
guaranteed social reproduction, albeit on asymmetrical terms. It consequently reduced those without 
property to the status of commodities, dependent on the sale of their labour to secure their survival needs.  
These changes were accompanied by an all-embracing process of institutional differentiation. The 
first important differentiation was that between the “private” domain of family, kin and community and 
the “public” domain of state, market and civil society. The second was within the public sphere itself: the 
division of roles and responsibilities between the institutions of state, market and civil society, each 
organised around its own internal logic. The modern state emerged in the course of this transformation as 
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the ascendant capitalist classes sought to enshrine the political and civil freedoms necessary for the spread 
of market relations and the viability of contracts, giving rise to a complex and specialised legal machinery, 
dedicated to enforcing law and order, upholding contractual agreements and administering justice. 
However, while the logic of the market reduced all factors needed for production to the status of 
commodities, treating them as if they had been produced solely for purchase and sale in the market place, 
this clearly did not apply in the case of three vital components of the economy: land, labour and money 
(Polyani 1944: 72). Land was a “natural”, rather than a “produced”, resource while money was a token of 
purchasing power rather than a value in itself. However, it was Polyani’s comments on the “fiction” of 
labour as commodity that is of particular relevance to the emergence of social policy in the European 
context.  
‘Labour’ he pointed out ‘is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which 
in its turn is not produced for sale, but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity actively be 
detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilised’ (p.72). It was precisely because labour was not just 
another commodity, but the embodiment of human agency, that those who relied on selling their labour 
power for their survival were able to demand recognition of their human status and to pressure the state 
for some degree of protection from the vagaries of the market place. The “de-commodification” of labour 
which resulted referred to various forms of social protection provided by the state which served to de-link 
the survival and well-being of individuals from the price they could command in the market place. It made 
universal access to a minimum level of real income a matter of right rather than charity or discretion. 
Social policy thus emerged in the European context to protect the dignity of labour in the course of its 
transition to a fully capitalist market economy. In some cases, it emerged in response to the demands of a 
militant labour movement; in others to prevent such a movement from coming into existence. However, it 
was a long drawn-out process. In England, ‘a great crucible in the formation of social security policy’, 
(Guhan 1992: 283) the transition in social relations from “custom to contract” took nearly five centuries 
to evolve, during which time state responsibility for social welfare grew from small scale to society wide, 
from permissive to mandatory and from piecemeal to complex and inter-related (Barr 1987, cited in 
Guhan 1992).  
 
3.2 “Historicising” institutions: the emergence of social policy in developing 
countries 
The emergence of the modern state – and of social policy – in the poorer economies of the world stands 
in stark contrast to this historical trajectory. There are important variations in the experience of developing 
countries which result from variations in their local contexts, their experience of colonisation and the 
cultural and political particularities of the colonial powers. However, there are also important 
commonalities. The “modern” state came into existence in these countries as an expression of colonial 
rule rather than of endogenous processes of socio-economic transformation. Its concern with converting 
and civilising the natives generally took second place to its imperial and commercial interests and there 
was little interest in broader or re-distributive goals. Not only did it fail to disrupt pre-existing relationships 
16 
based on custom, kinship and “moral economy”, but it set out to strengthen and reify them, using the 
authoritarian possibilities inherent within the local social order – inventing them where necessary – to 
promote its control over the local population (Mamdani 1996).  
The policies which resulted were thus the product of a particular ‘politics of needs interpretation’ 
(Fraser 1989), a particular set of interpretations about which (and whose) needs were legitimate matters for 
public policy, how these were to be satisfied and the availability of resources for their satisfaction. They 
were partial in coverage and dualistic in structure, and they embodied the priorities of the rulers rather 
than the needs of the ruled. Manji (2000) describes the situation in the context of sub-Saharan Africa:  
 
Colonial government social services for Africans were minimal. Social policy was geared towards 
ensuring the integrity of the structures of colonial rule and a reasonably efficient exploitation of the 
colony. The goals of social development (such as they were) were defined in the metropolis . . . 
Health services were provided during serious epidemics, principally to prevent infections spreading 
into white society. Limited education was provided when certain basic skills were deemed necessary 
for the administration or exploitation of the colony . . . Although on the eve of independence there 
were to be significant changes in the extent to which investments were to be made in the social 
sectors, for the most part the state’s function in these sectors was to provide for only a minority 
(p12).  
 
This privileged minority was made up of expatriate members of the colonial administration and the settler 
community together with those native officials and organised sector workers who were most directly 
associated with colonial rule (Bevan 2001).  
Colonised populations consequently achieved national independence as socially-embedded members 
of kinship, community, lineage and clan rather than as rights-bearing citizens. They embarked on 
independent nationhood committed to a “modern” social policy, or what has been called ‘the post-
colonial social contract’ (Laakso and Olakushi 1996, cited in Morales-Gomez 1999), largely modelled on 
those which had prevailed in the colonial “mother” countries, but in contexts where the economic 
transformations of “Polyanian” magnitude had not occurred, giving rise to institutionally differentiated 
spheres for the conduct of economic, political and social activities. Instead processes of economic 
accumulation and social reproduction tend to be institutionalised in these contexts within ‘inter-penetrating 
arenas of polity, economy, society and kin networks’ (Bevan 2001: 11) leading to segmented social 
formations and states which remain “socially embedded” rather than achieving the degree of autonomy 
from society necessary to promote developmental goals.  
The early decades of development in the newly-independent states of Africa and Asia did see some 
important achievements in relation to social development. Most countries experienced rapid increases in 
life expectancy, adult literacy, primary enrolment ratios in the years following independence. These gains 
partly reflected the very low base from which most of these countries started out but it is unlikely that they 
would have been achieved if policy efforts had been entirely confined to privileged elites. As Leys (1996) 
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observes in relation to the African context between 1960 and 1979: ‘Millions of Africans remained in 
abject poverty, but the poverty of many millions was less abject than it had been twenty years before’ 
(p120).  
At least part of the failure to sustain these achievements over the longer run can be traced to various 
biases built into the models of social provisioning which dominated in these countries. As we noted 
earlier, such policies had been developed to address the needs of formally employed workers and their 
families in highly urbanised societies whereas the problem these governments faced was to meet the needs 
of smallholders, tenant farmers and landless labourers living in the rural areas who made up the bulk of 
the population in their countries. Cooper (1996) captures this disjuncture well in his description of how 
the idea of “modern” social policy took hold in African states: ‘. . . new leaders – before and after 
independence and in dialogue with “experts” of the “developed world” – came to define social policy 
around an imported future more than an extension of an observed present, around a package of 
institutions like labour unions, minimum wage regulations, and industrial wage machinery rather than 
around the complex, category-crossing social processes that had been going on around them’ (p. 5).  
It was not surprising that from the outset, this policy model was biased towards formal employment 
in the urban economy and to that extent privileged a section of the labour force that was already better 
organised than the rest. The rest of the labour force, the majority, in fact, who lived in the countryside, 
were often self-employed and very weakly integrated into formal markets, trade union organisation and 
service delivery systems, were largely excluded. They relied instead on their own efforts, or on the efforts 
of the communities in which they lived to provide them with some degree of protection in times of crisis. 
Policy-makers operated with a dualist model of social provisioning: they recognised that “modern” state 
provision reached a very small minority of the population and that the vast majority relied on “traditional” 
safety nets within the community, but they had little understanding of how the two sectors might relate to 
each other. It was assumed that as the state-based provision of modern social services expanded to rural 
areas, it would gradually replace these traditional forms of community-based provisioning, bringing all 
sections of the population within uniform framework of provision (Bloom and Standing 2001).  
However, this assumption did not factor in the way in which policies take root within institutional 
structures which then help to shape their future trajectory in particular directions. The “imported” social 
policy model came, as noted earlier, as a predetermined package of institutional arrangements, which over 
time became deeply entrenched within the bureaucratic structure. Along with a hierarchical understanding 
of policy, which privileged “the economic” and gave “the social” the welfarist connotations noted earlier, 
the model was also associated with the rise of different ministries or agencies, specialising in the vertically-
organised delivery of particular services, each operating independently from others, and with little regard 
to the cross-cutting nature of the livelihood strategies and social needs of the bulk of the population they 
were supposed to be serving. As Devereux and Cook observe, ‘such bureaucratisation of the social sectors 
established strong vested interests among politicians and civil servants for their continuation along sectoral 
lines, and set ministries in competition against each other for allocations of scarce public resources’ 
(2000: 66).  
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One group of beneficiaries of ‘this zero-sum game’ (Devereux and Cook 2000) were the ministries 
with the largest political clout – usually those most able to argue their case in terms of contributions to 
economic growth or political expediency rather than to meeting the needs of less advantaged sections of 
society. The second group were the sections of the population who worked in the formal economy, 
particularly those in the public sector: the urban educated middle classes along with the more privileged 
sections of the organised working class who worked in nationalised industry. High-cost tertiary services in 
education and health and social benefits for formal sector employees absorbed a disproportionate amount 
of government and donor resources in the early years of development planning and served to limit the 
expansion of the primary and less expensive forms of provision which would have benefited the bulk of 
the populations in question. 
The primary losers were the rural poor. Not only did they find difficulty in gaining access to much of 
state-provided social services, despite their purported universalism, but the approach taken made the 
recognition and accommodation of their needs within the structure of public provision extremely unlikely. 
Devereux and Cook explain why: ‘a sectoralised approach imposes a false structure and set of choices 
which conceals the complexity of poor people’s livelihoods. Central to our argument is the recognition 
that people’s lives are not compartmentalised in the way that sector-driven policy suggests, and that this 
lack of compartmentalisation is most evident among low-income rural populations . . .’ (2000: 67).  
Sector-driven policies have prevented policy-makers from appreciating the intimate inter-
relationships between production and reproduction within the household economy and, by extension, 
within the wider society. As a result, they have tended to view economic growth and social development, 
and the economic and social policies associated with each, in terms of “trade-offs” rather than “synergies”. 
They failed to recognise, for instance, that investments in human capital and capabilities, the key assets at 
the disposal of the poor in poor countries, have profound economic as well as social implications. They 
failed also to recognise that in much of the world those who were primarily responsible for reproduction, 
usually women, also played an active role in production. Consequently, the increased participation of 
women in production, whether as a result of deliberate policy to promote growth or as an unintended 
effect of such policies, could only be achieved if they cut back on their responsibilities in reproduction, to 
the detriment of those they cared for, or else intensified their labour efforts, to their own detriment.  
 
3.3 Changing configurations of social provisioning: deregulation, privatisation 
and globalisation  
The biases built into the model of social provisioning adopted by many developing countries in the early 
decades of development, the top-down, urban-oriented and high-cost approaches which they promoted, 
were important factors in explaining why so many fell so short of the goal of universal provision. Instead, 
the weakness of the indigenous capitalist class in most of the poorer countries, their limited success with 
industrialisation, the slow and uneven spread of market relations, the gulf between urban and rural life, the 
state’s lack of autonomy from elite interest groups within society and the limits placed on its field of action 
by external political and economic forces all meant that life within these societies remained embedded, or 
19 
at least significantly governed by, the social relationships of kin, community and moral economy, which 
were largely based on principles of unequal reciprocity. It was within these relationships that the majority 
of the poor sought to meet their needs and to these relationships that they looked for protection against 
the risks and uncertainties endemic to the contexts in which they lived.  
The economic crises which overtook large parts of the world by the late 1970s brought a new set of 
problems and challenges. The neo-liberal adjustment policies imposed by the international financial 
institutions as part of their lending package to countries that found themselves facing unmanageable 
internal and external deficits began a reversal of the “post-colonial social contract”. It was replaced by a 
new market-centred dualism which entailed a direct attack on the active role assumed by the state in post-
colonial era and a restructuring of societies to give freer rein to market forces. This included the 
deregulation of labour markets to promote their flexibility, the withdrawal of the state from responsibility 
for social provisioning in favour of private providers, and the imposition of user charges on those forms 
of state provision which remained intact. This new approach to social provisioning hit poor people 
hardest with negative implications for equity (Colclough 1997; Simms 2000). For those that could not pay, 
the downloading of social responsibility by the state placed the full burden of survival onto the shoulders 
of the poor, with poorer women bearing a disproportionate share of the burden (Elson 1991; Moser 
1989).  
By the 1990s, trenchant critiques of the neo-liberal view of “the social” and the policy failures 
associated with it, were giving rise to a growing interest in “welfare pluralism” which was based on the 
recognition that a wide array of institutional actors, including the state, markets and civil society, could 
usefully play a role in meeting social needs. The new model was probably closer to the prevailing reality 
than the old ones ever were. Despite its undoubted successes, the post-colonial social contract had failed 
to include large sections of sections of the population of poor countries who continued to rely on self-
provisioning within the household, informal provision within the community or on various service-
oriented missionary organisations and NGOs. This de facto pluralism expanded in later years, when 
official efforts to privatise social services as a part of the restructuring of the state were accompanied by a 
process of unofficial privatisation, as public providers sought to supplement their eroding livelihoods by 
engaging in off-the-record provision of social services.3 There was also a growing “marketisation” of 
informal provision as services previously provided as an aspect of the moral economy were increasingly 
being offered in return for fees (money) or “gifts” (goods and services).4 The distinction between public 
and private provision became increasingly more difficult to sustain (Bloom and Standing 2001). 
                                                           
3  In Uganda, for instance, villagers complained that health workers would ask them if they had come with “their 
brother” in other words, with money, before giving any treatment (Lucas and Nuwagaba 1999). In India and 
Bangladesh, an entire “shadow industry” of private tuition has sprung made up largely of teachers teaching the 
same children in the evenings that they had apparently failed to teach during school hours. 
4  White, for instance, noted the spread of medical practice in rural Uganda to a wide range of agents as cleaners, 
technicians, drivers and storekeepers used knowledge gained in public health facilities to set up their own 
businesses, treating others for a fee.   
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The other major factor altering institutional patterns of social provision and social security within 
national contexts has been globalisation. Globalisation has accelerated the flow of finances, ideas and 
values across the world, increasing the range of signals transmitted across societies and increasing levels of 
risk of systemic malfunction or disconnection. Old boundaries between the rural and urban, formal and 
informal, and national and international are being reconstituted in this new and fluid environment. Older 
forms of livelihoods have been eroded and new ones have emerged which bring world’s working 
population into greater interdependence with each other: ‘the destinies of people from all walks of life – 
Czech steelworkers, US school teachers, Ghanaian cocoa farmers, Argentine restaurateurs – are 
increasingly interwoven in a dense web of financial transactions whose speed and volume are difficult to 
comprehend’ (UNRISD 1995: 27). There has been a significant increase in migration flows as people 
move from rural areas to the cities or across national borders, often illegally, in search of better lives and 
livelihoods, pushed by the absence of opportunities in their own environments or pulled by images of 
affluence and a better life.  
Globalisation has had important implications for patterns of social provisioning as well. The 
emergence of globally integrated capital markets, the distinctive feature of the current phase of 
globalisation, has undermined the capacity and commitment of national governments to secure the 
livelihoods of their vulnerable population. The need to attract capital has led many governments, in both 
developed and developing countries, to cut back on taxation and hence on the revenue necessary to 
finance social expenditure at the same time as competing with each other to provide as flexible a labour 
force as they can get away with. Labour markets which once had sizeable segments of regular, full-time 
wage employment have been deregulated to give rise to more diverse, informal and casualised patterns of 
activity.  
Globalisation has also opened up the provision of goods and services, including many vital to the 
social reproduction of life and livelihoods, to the forces of international competition (Deacon 1999). 
Trans-national companies see the growing middle classes of the Third World as important new markets 
for their products. The option of purchasing education, health, social insurance, pensions etc. from these 
global providers is being taken up by growing sections of national elites in the Third World, undercutting 
an important incentive for cross-class support for any form of public provision. These processes are likely 
to be accelerated as the result of the role of the World Trade Organisation in fostering global markets in 
social services through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It may have been possible at 
the start of the twentieth century to discuss policies for socially sustainable development within the 
framework of national contexts, but by the end of it, there is increasing awareness of the need for global 
social policies to complement and strengthen national ones.  
The main point to take from the discussion in this section is that when we talk about the institutional 
configurations of social provisioning in different parts of the world, we are talking about historically 
differentiated formations characterised by very different relationships between states, markets and 
communities. There are those which are included in the “welfare regimes” literature, which entered the 
twentieth century having undergone major structural transformations, which moved them from societies 
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based on pre- or only partially-commodified social to generalised market relations, from principles of 
access based on custom to principles based on contract. This process of transformation generated both 
the need for collective responsibility for social security as well as the wealth which could finance it. When 
social security measures were introduced in Germany and Britain, both countries were well advanced in 
their industrial revolutions (Barr 1987; Stumpf 1979).  
In other parts of the world, where markets still have not penetrated every aspect of the economy, and 
where customary relationships continue to play an important role in production and exchange, the risks 
and insecurities faced by individuals and the means by which they sought to meet their needs and secure 
their future were likely to be very different. How different developing countries have dealt with the 
problem of meeting social need, given their limited resource base and scale of poverty they had to deal 
with, and the implications of their efforts for processes of social reproduction in their differing contexts 
clearly have lessons for thinking about social policies in the coming decades. We turn to examples of the 
different approaches taken by some of these countries in the next section to draw out some of their basic 
lessons.  
 
4  Development policy and regimes of social reproduction 
 
4.1 Translating resources into outcomes: the role of public policy  
The twin challenges which faced these countries as they embarked on the process of development were to 
expand the resources at their disposal through economic growth and to utilise them to promote the well-
being of their population through social development. Their differing attempts to achieve these goals gave 
rise to differing regimes of social reproduction, embodying differing institutional relations of production 
and reproduction, defining differing boundaries between public responsibility and private initiative and 
generating differing patterns of economic growth and human development. Table A2.1, which reports on 
the ranking achieved by a selected number of countries in terms of their per capita income and their 
human development index summarises some of these patterns. It suggests, in the first instance, that there 
is a broadly positive relationship between a country’s resources, as measured by its per capita income, and 
its social development. Thus the richer OECD countries generally have higher levels of social 
development than the poorer developing countries. This is to be expected: higher levels of income 
increase the resources available for investment in social well-being, regardless of whether the investment is 
undertaken privately or publicly.  
However, the table also shows that there is no inevitability about this relationship. Botswana, which 
had a per capita income of $3240 in 1999 has a much higher income ranking at 87 than China which had a 
per capita income of $780 and was ranked at 142. However, China is ranked 87 in terms of its human 
development achievements in the same year while Botswana is ranked much lower at 114. Cross-country 
regression analyses of the relationship between economic growth and social development confirm both 
the positive relationship between the two as well as the existence of various deviations from this 
relationship in both positive and negative directions (see, for instance, Dreze and Sen 1989; Mundle 1994; 
22 
Moore et al. 2000). Moore et al. calculated what they called a RICE index (relative income conversion 
efficiency) to measure the extent to which countries were able to achieve the levels of human development 
predicted by their level of per capita income Their estimates of the RICE index for a selected number of 
countries is presented in Table A2.3. The key variables which proved significant in explaining variations in 
the RICE index are reported in Table 2.4 and will be discussed in the rest of this section.  
Attempts to measure the relationship between the economic resources of a country and its social 
achievements thus give rise to three broad categories of countries. The first category is made up of 
countries which conform to the standardised relationship in that their levels of human development are in 
line with those predicted by their levels of income. Of course, some of these countries are at the lower end 
of the income scale with lower levels of human development while others are the high end. The second 
category is made up of the “positive outliers”, those countries which deviate in a positive direction from 
the “standard” relationship, having achieved levels of human development higher than would be expected 
on the basis of their income. The third category of countries, the “negative outliers”, are those which 
deviate in a negative direction from the standard relationship because their levels of income have not 
translated into expected levels of human development. Some illustrative examples of countries with 
equivalent levels of per capita income but very different levels of human development are provided in 
Table A2.2.  
Attempts to explain variations in the relationship between the economic “resources” and social 
“outcomes” across different samples of developing countries have highlighted a number of important 
factors. Some of these factors belong to the “context” dimension of the analytical framework outlined in 
Figure 1.2. For instance, one contextual variable that proved significant in explaining variations in the 
value of the RICE index was population density: Moore et al found that countries with higher population 
densities tended to have higher than average levels of human development for their level of national 
income. This could reflect the fact that higher levels of population density make it simpler and cheaper for 
public authorities to provide education and health services. It is also easier to mobilise politically to 
demand such services in contexts where people lived closely to each other.  
Contextual differences probably also explain why countries in the West African region appear to be 
less successful than others at equivalent, or even lower, levels of per capita income in translating their 
national incomes into human development. The higher incidence of endemic tropical diseases in the 
region than most other parts of the world has made the cost of increasing life expectancy correspondingly 
higher than elsewhere (Moore et al. 1999). In addition, the initial distribution of income also appears to 
play a role in explaining subsequent social performance: countries which start out with higher levels of 
economic equality are better able to translate economic growth into poverty reduction than those starting 
out from a position of greater inequality (Hanmer and Naschold 2000; White and Anderson 2001).  
However, along with these contextual variables, variations in the relationship between economic 
resources and social outcomes across countries also appears to reflect differences in their policy regimes. 
These differences can be categorised as those relating to “commitment”, the vision of “the social” which 
guides the development effort, and those which relate to “capacity”, the ability of the state to translate this 
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vision into practice. As far as differences in policy “commitments” are concerned, Dreze and Sen (1989) 
make an important distinction between “support-led” and “growth-mediated” approaches to social 
development. The former has entailed direct public policy intervention in processes of social reproduction 
through wide ranging measures of employment provision, income redistribution, health care, education 
and social assistance in order to address human development goals without necessarily waiting for 
transformation in the general level of prosperity. As might be expected, countries which have adopted this 
approach have tended to fall into the category of countries which report higher levels of human 
development than would be expected on their basis of their per capita incomes. However, this approach is 
only likely to be economically sustainable if it gives rise to a “virtuous development cycle” in which 
increasing levels of human development feed into increasing rates of economic growth. Where this does 
not occur, stagnating levels of income may lead to a decline in human development achievements in the 
longer run.  
Growth-led approaches use the potentialities released by increased national income to improve social 
well-being, both through increasing private affluence as well as facilitating greater public provision. 
However, a growth-led approach is different from the indiscriminate pursuit of economic growth. An 
important feature of states, such as South Korea, which adopted a growth-mediated approach to social 
development has been the broad-based expansion of employment opportunities as an aspect of the 
growth strategy, with the state playing a conspicuous role. The fruits of growth were consequently more 
equitably distributed in contrast to the inegalitarianism associated with countries like Brazil and Oman 
which pursued a strategy of what Dreze and Sen term “unaimed opulence”.  
As far as policy capacity is concerned, two inter-related factors emerge as important: the resources at 
the disposal of the state and the relationship between state and society, particularly its degree of insulation 
from powerful sectional interests within that society. Discussions about the resources available to the 
state, the fiscal dimension, have traditionally concentrated on level and pattern of public spending. While 
this has an obvious role in explaining variations in social development outcomes, recent analysis suggests 
that public expenditure may, in fact, be an intermediate variable, one of the routes through which the size 
and, more importantly, the sources of public revenue have served to influence both state capacity and 
commitment.  
For instance, Moore et al. (1999) found that states which draw their revenue from mineral wealth 
reported lower levels of human development relative to their income than those which relied on tax-based 
revenues. The relationship is less clear-cut for countries which rely heavily on aid to finance development. 
While countries with high levels of aid dependence performed badly in relation to human development 
relative to their income levels, countries with low levels did not necessarily perform well. The explanation 
for this finding, Moore suggests (2001), lies in the very different forms of behaviour associated with 
different sources of state revenue and their implications for quality of governance, accountability to civil 
society and administrative infrastructure. States that rely on taxation have to “earn” their income in that 
they have to put in organisational and political effort in working with their citizens and generate the 
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necessary administrative infrastructure in order to get them to part with their money. Fiscal policies thus 
contribute to the state “capacity” in the administrative sense as well as in terms of resources.  
They also contribute to “commitment”: such states are more likely to be responsive to the needs of 
their citizens and to have a direct stake in promoting their welfare. By contrast, states which are largely 
reliant on income from concentrated mineral (mainly oil) sources are largely independent of their citizens 
and have little direct interest in their welfare. High levels of aid dependence also tend to undermine state 
accountability by disrupting the relationship that exists between states and tax-paying citizens and 
removing aspects of public expenditure decisions from the need for public or legislative scrutiny. 
There has also been some debate about the importance of democratic institutions for both state 
“capacity” and “commitment”. It has been suggested, for instance, that India has been able to avert 
famine to a much greater degree since its independence than China (Dreze and Sen 1989) or the countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa (de Waal 1997) because of its greater degree of democratic freedom, including ‘a 
political system of adversarial journalism and opposition’ (Dreze and Sen 1989).  
However, on the basis of his review of Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Kerala and Sri Lanka, all 
countries which reported remarkable progress on social development, but had very differing political 
regimes, Ghai (1997) concluded that, while liberal democracies may provide a more favourable 
environment for the promotion of pro-poor social policies, regimes which had not taken the electoral 
route to power have often demonstrated commitment to such policies as a means of gaining social 
legitimacy or consolidating popular support. Moreover, Kohli (1987) suggests that both revolutionary 
communist and authoritarian regimes, with their strong, centralised state apparatus, also appear to have 
had greater capacity to undertake broader developmental goals than nationalist democratic states, such as 
India, or fragmented states, such as Bangladesh, whose authority structures have failed to gel.  
Moore et al. (1999) found little evidence of a relationship between degree of electoral democracy and 
performance in terms of human development in their study. However they suggest that their estimates of 
the relationship may have been complicated by the existence of “peoples’ democracies”, such as China and 
Vietnam, who adopted pro-poor social policies but were not particularly democratic. The virtual 
disappearance of this category as these societies move towards market-based economies may lead to a 
closer relationship in future data between democracy and human development.  
On the other hand, what Moore et al did find was a significant, but unexpectedly negative association 
between the “quality of political institutions” in a country and its ability to translate its GNP into human 
development. This apparently perverse finding is explained by the fact that their measure of the quality of 
political institutions was based on the score given to countries by the International Country Risk Guide 
which is intended to assist the international business community in their lending and investment decisions. 
Although these scores are also widely used by international aid and development agencies as a way of 
measuring “good governance”, Moore et al. suggest that what they actually measured was how well a 
country performed in the eyes of international investors. To that extent, their findings can be taken to 
suggest that countries that performed well by the criteria of global capital did not generally perform well in 
relation to their own citizens. 
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4.2 Policy regimes and resource-outcome variations: some case studies 
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that a cluster of variables related to context, capacity and 
commitment help to explain variations in resource-to-outcome relationships across developing countries, 
giving rise to a loose typology of “regimes of social reproduction”. In this section we describe some of the 
policy aspects of these regimes, drawing mainly on examples from the African and Asian regions where 
our research programme was located. The first category in our typology is made up of a number of 
revolutionary communist regimes, such as those of China, Cuba and Vietnam, which routinely feature in 
studies concerned with societies whose human development outcomes were considerably higher than 
others at equivalent levels of income (Dreze and Sen 1987; Ghai 1997; Mehrotra and Jolly 1997) These 
regimes had a vision of “the social” which was rooted in a strongly egalitarian ideology in which human 
beings were seen as the ultimate source of value in society. As Acharya et al. (2001: 209) put it in the 
context of pre-reform China: 
 
The creation of the material prerequisites for building socialism in China was inseparable from the 
creation of the “new socialist man” . . . It is essential to understand this stress on, and belief, in the 
limitless capacity of human beings to fully comprehend the various mass campaigns and mass 
movements that were so crucial a part of the overall development strategies in China. 
 
Governments in these countries generally embarked on the transformation of their societies without 
making a strong distinction between the “economic” and the “social” in their construction of policy. The 
provision of basic social services was seen as investments in the country’s most important resource, its 
labour power, a strategy which had the additional advantage of helping to consolidate political support for 
the party. The centralised command of the economy which characterised these regimes also gave their 
governments considerable autonomy in carrying out radical forms of redistribution as the basis of their 
overall development effort. As Ahmad and Hussein (1991: 248) point out in the case of China: 
 
. . . pervasive State control of industry and fundamental changes in the land tenure have made it 
possible for measures for preventing and alleviating deprivation to be built into the fabric of the 
economy to a degree that simply would not be feasible in an evolutionary framework. 
 
The resulting policies, which sought to promote a universal, rather than uniform, access to social 
provision, reflected an integrated approach to the social and the economic: 
 
Social security provision was integrated into the economy through an egalitarian approach to income 
distribution, the collective organisation of production and distribution, combined with an 
institutional system of relief which acted as a guarantee of minimal economic and social needs for 
much of the population. Social welfare was thus an integral part of economic policy and planning 
rather than a separate residual sector (Cook 2001).  
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Universality was achieved through a social security system premised on two key features: provision of all 
rural households with access to agricultural land, either individually or collectively, and guaranteeing some 
form of employment to all urban residents with urban registration (Ahmad and Hussain,1991) . These 
“two guarantees” provided the Chinese population with a degree of economic security ‘rare in developing 
countries’ (p. 299). There were also social security programmes geared to specific contingencies (disaster 
relief) and to protect particular vulnerable groups (poor regions; the destitute elderly) as well as the 
extension of health care to the vast majority of the rural population; these are described by Ahmad and 
Hussain as the other major achievement of the Chinese economy in the field of social security. 
While most socialist countries have abandoned centralised planning in favour of market forces, their 
experiences provide an important reminder of the possibility of alternative regimes of social reproduction, 
and hence alternative principles of allocation and access, to the free-market models which dominate the 
development agenda today. However, it is also important to bear in mind that, while their human 
achievements were considerable, so were their human costs: the largest famine in history occurred in 
China during its Great Leap Forward. Moreover, China’s adoption of a one-child policy in the late 1970s 
as means of reducing its population growth rate has given rise to extremely unbalanced sex ratios at birth 
as families use various means to abort females in a society in which strong son preference has not been 
wiped out. 
With the transition to the market, there has been a reduction in overall poverty but new forms of 
inequality and exclusion have emerged (Cook 2001). The resources at the disposal of the state have also 
declined leaving it with less capacity to address these emerging problems. For instance, the current 
percentage of tax revenue to GNP in China is remarkably low at 6.1 per cent (1999 figures), but as Wang 
(2002) points out in her analysis of the budget process, these provide no indication of the various official 
and unofficial payments exacted by the government at the local level. If, as Cook argues in her analysis of 
social policy challenges in China today, social equity arguments require a return to a need-based approach 
to social provision in place of its current attempts to embrace a demand-based one, fiscal measures will 
have to be at the heart of the new approach. 
Sri Lanka, Costa Rica and the Indian state of Kerala also frequently feature as examples of 
countries/states whose human development performance achievements outstrip their levels of national 
income, but who have effected their achievements through a democratic route. Their experiences draw 
attention to civil society as a critical space for the exercise of public influence on social policy. While 
differing in their ideologies – Sri Lanka and Kerala have both had left-leaning governments – these are all 
countries where vibrant social movements succeeded in ensuring some degree of responsiveness on the 
part of the state to its less powerful citizens and sufficient autonomy from powerful propertied interests 
within the society to effectively pursue re-distributive strategies.  
Ghai, for instance, notes in relation to Costa Rica: ‘The consensual political style was facilitated by 
participatory democracy with a strong role played by trade unions, peasant associations, cooperatives and 
other segments of civil society’ (1997: 15). In addition, as Chant points out, it is also characterised by 
major achievements with respect to gender-aware legislation and policy. In Sri Lanka, electoral 
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competition between the parties of both left and right spurred each to make commitments on the social 
development front while pressure from rural and urban unions, social movements and the middle classes 
ensured that this translated into practice. Finally, Kerala was characterised by powerful radical and social 
movements, consisting not only of workers’ organisations in urban and rural areas, but also students, 
teachers and women’s associations of various kinds as well as by a powerful communist party which was 
voted into power. Social outcomes in Kerala have been remarkable for their gender egalitarianism in a 
country which is otherwise characterised by extreme forms of gender inequality.  
The countries discussed so far all represent examples of “support-mediated” strategies to human 
development. They shared a strong political commitment to the provision of health and education services 
to the entire population, in some cases in response to an egalitarian state ideology, in others in response to 
the need for political or social legitimacy. In all cases, the state played a central role in extending this core 
of social services to the entire country, its success a reflection of both its administrative capacity and the 
existence of infrastructure necessary for universal coverage.  
A contrasting route to human development is provided by the “growth-mediated” regimes of social 
reproduction which characterised the fast-growing economies of East Asia. These were all based on 
authoritarian capitalist states for much of the post-war period. Civil society remained weak with trade 
unions subject to draconian measures and NGOs actively discouraged. There was thus weak pressure on 
the state to address wider social concerns. The result was a development strategy which clearly 
subordinated social to economic goals.  
South Korea for instance, combined an ‘authoritarian developmental state’ with ‘residual competitive 
form of social policy’ (Shin 2000, cited in Gough 2001). The ideological preferences of its ruling coalition 
of authoritarian political leaders, economic technocrats and chaebols (large family-owned family groups) 
favoured state investments to support rapid economic growth and adopted extensive credit controls and 
incentives, the dissemination of information and infra-structural investments towards this end. Apart from 
this, however, the social ministries were subordinated to the Economic Planning Board, and state 
spending confined only to those aspects of social policy which were considered conducive to rapid 
industrialisation. The rest was left to private initiative. 
The East Asian model of growth was fiscally conservative (Mundle 1998): the tax shares of these 
states were around 15 per cent of their GDP (South Korea, Singapore) in contrast to shares which ranged 
from around 18 per cent (Canada) to 43 per cent (Netherlands) in the OECD countries (1990 figures from 
WDR 2001). An even more significant contrast between the two groups of countries relates to how state 
revenue was allocated. While the OECD countries as a group spent around 60 per cent of total public 
expenditure on social spending, of which two-thirds was on social security (Mundle 1998), there was little 
direct spending on social welfare in the East Asian states (Dreze and Sen 1989; Yang 2000). The South 
Korean state made no special effort to promote the health status of its population for nearly three decades 
following its independence from Japan (Mehrotra et al. 1997). Instead, it provided a range of incentives to 
private providers of social insurance and other welfare services.  
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South Korea financed its growth through some of the highest rates of private saving in the world. 
According to the 1991 data cited by Mundle, it was a “negative outlier”. Of the countries covered by his 
study, South Korea and Oman had the highest per capita GNP but lower-than-predicted Human 
Development Index. However, its relatively poor human development achievements have to be assessed 
against two foundational aspects of its regime of social reproduction which were the product of public 
policy. The first was extensive land redistribution undertaken in the early years of its independence from 
Japan. This provided some degree of social security to the small farmers who made up the bulk of its 
population at the time as well as the incentive to invest in the productivity of agriculture. It also meant that 
the country embarked on its growth process from “initial conditions” of relative economic equality5 in the 
distribution of assets – unlike the majority of developing countries in other parts of the world.  
In addition, the state played a very active role in the promotion of livelihoods. This role included the 
encouragement of labour-intensive industries, the maintenance of comparative advantage in labour-
intensive manufacturing through the ruthless preservation of competitive labour markets (largely through 
repression of trade unions) and large-scale investment in basic education (primary plus lower secondary) at 
a very early stage of development because of its perceived implications for economic productivity. These 
actions also promoted a relatively egalitarian growth strategy in contrast with, for instance, the “unaimed 
opulence” of Oman and Brazil.  
Elsewhere, in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, performance in terms of economic growth as well 
as human development has varied considerably. South Asian countries generally report even lower ratios 
of tax to GDP than the East Asian countries, but this is a reflection of weak political commitment rather 
than fiscal discipline. The Indian experience, and its contrast to the Chinese one, despite the similarities in 
the conditions under which they embarked on their development strategies in the 1950s, exemplifies the 
limitations on the re-distributive choices available within a nationalist “democratic-capitalist” framework 
(Kohli 1987).  
The Indian state was committed from independence to the planned establishment of heavy industries 
as the foundation of its strategy for industrialisation and growth. The central government was given 
constitutional power over the key levers of economic policy, including public ownership of industry. In 
marked contrast to this determined effort to transform the relations of production, efforts to transform 
the relations of reproduction of what was an extremely hierarchical social order, based on entrenched 
inequalities of caste, class and gender, were at best half-hearted. Instead, in deference to the political clout 
of the landed upper castes, the most politically regressive group in the country, significant limits were 
placed on the ability of central government to undertake re-distributive measures, including land reform 
and direct redistribution thorough agricultural taxation. These powers were left to state governments 
where they were effectively blocked by the local elites.  
                                                           
5  Although as Greenhalgh (1985) and Seguino (2000) have noted, this did not extend to gender equality. Indeed, 
Greenhalgh argues that the East Asian growth model was premised on marked gender inequality in wages and 
employment opportunities.  
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The weak commitment to re-distributive goals is reflected and reproduced in its fiscal policy: the tax 
share of the central government is extremely low: around 6 per cent in 1998 (Mooij and Dev 2002). 
However, this estimate takes no account of levels of revenue and social expenditure undertaken at state 
level, variations in which have introduced considerable variations in economic and social performance 
across India. While various finance ministers in the 1980s and 1990s, the period covered by Mooij and 
Dev, have sought to broaden the direct tax base and the share of direct to indirect tax revenue has gone 
up (from 20 per cent in 1990 to 35 per cent in 2000), none have ever proposed to introduce taxes on 
agricultural income. On the contrary, farmers receive support in the form of cheap credit schemes, price 
support, subsidies on food and agriculture, loan waivers etc. The absence of any tax on agricultural 
earnings, despite the importance of agriculture as a component of national income, thus continues to be 
one of the striking features of the Indian budget (Mooij and Dev 2002).  
The Indian state has consequently neither succeeded in breaking the social power of the landlords 
nor in enlisting the support of the rural masses (Acharya et al. 2001: 211). Despite rhetorical commitment, 
and with some exceptions, its land reforms, especially implementation of “land ceilings” and consequent 
redistribution, have not been very successful, leaving the majority of its rural population without basic 
economic security. The “sectoralisation” of the development effort did little to challenge pre-existing 
dualistic structures of social provision and the hierarchy of interests which they embodied. Those who had 
been favoured in the colonial era – civil servants and organised sector workers – were able to use their 
strong position to ensure the perpetuation of their privileges. As Guhan (1992: 288) pointed out, ‘It is 
clear that the coverage of benefits is concentrated to a high degree in the organised public and private 
sectors of employment which in India constitute no more than 12 per cent of the work-force. Public 
employees are served best, or rather have ensured that they are best served’. While industrial workers in 
the organised sector are less well placed than those in white collar jobs, they do in principle have recourse 
to a structure of legislation which offers them a measure of state-provided social protection.  
For the rest of the population, however, the poor and unorganised in both urban and rural 
economies, a disproportionate percentage of whom are from socially excluded castes and tribal groups, 
there is a ‘ramshackle and leaky raft of anti-poverty policies, targeted development schemes, employment 
guarantees and food security measures often managed as a by-product of the public distribution of grain 
. . . They are all that capital allows the state to achieve in this direction’ (Harris-White 2000: 6). 
Furthermore, the incorporation of religion into the country’s civil code, thereby positioning women as 
lesser citizens relative to men, has done little to challenge the extreme forms of gender inequality which 
characterise the country, aspects of which appear to be getting worse over time.6 
The power of dominant interest groups is also evident in the fiscal regime prevailing in Bangladesh 
(Mahmud 2002). Here too the low ratio of tax to GDP of 9 per cent reflects the absence of 
“commitment” rather than fiscal discipline. Evasion of tax is high, particularly of income tax, so that more 
progressive direct taxes make up only 15 per cent of the tax revenue. The political costs for ruling parties 
                                                           
6  See, for instance, Agnihotri (2000) and various contributions to Kapadia (2002). 
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of attempting to enforce strict tax compliance (“earn” its income) has meant that it is the Annual 
Development Plan, which is the more pro-poor aspect of government expenditure, rather than the 
revenue budget, out of which civil service salaries are paid, which bears the burden of any shortfalls in 
public revenue.  
Mahmud’s discussion of budgetary processes in the context of Bangladesh points to some of the 
problematic outcomes associated with the phenomenon of institutional inter-penetration touched on 
earlier in the paper. The behaviour of policy-makers ensures that they subvert their own policies, in some 
cases, for personal gain, in others, for political capital: 
 
Spoils and privileges are parcelled out among different clientele as an essential tool of political 
management. . . . The control over the delivery of public services is viewed as a means of fostering 
patron-client relationships and creating vote banks . . . Members of Parliament, instead of being 
concerned with law-making and national policies, become lobbyists for procuring projects for their 
respective constituencies – by no means a healthy process of selection of development projects.  
Much of the wastage in public resource management at the local level, such as the alleged 
leakage of resources in the rural works programme, is the result of the above system. It also partly 
explains many weaknesses in the implementation of local development projects. For example, 
disproportionately more funds are allocated for constructing new local roads than for the 
maintenance of existing ones: the former is perceived as a public service rendered by the local 
Member of Parliament, the latter as only the routine work of the concerned government agencies 
(p15). 
 
Analysis of highly aid-dependent countries have drawn attention to the way that policy agendas get shaped 
when competing visions of “the social” have to be negotiated by institutionally-asymmetrical actors. This 
is evident in the Bangladesh case. While official development assistance has declined from 6.9 per cent of 
GNP in 1990 to around 2.7 per cent in 1998, Bangladesh remains vulnerable to the shifts and vicissitudes 
of donor thinking. As Mahmud comments: ‘Too many of Bangladesh’s development programmes have 
been donor-driven. The syndrome of “donor-dependence” is manifest in the absence of institutional 
capacities or their rise and fall with donor-funded project cycles’ (p.12). 
Others have also commented on the “projectisation” of development associated with aid 
dependence, a product of the workings of donor agencies, each of which have their own ‘agendas, 
priorities, targets and procedures’ (Moore 2001: 31). This may be superseded over time by the shift to 
direct budget support through sector-wide approaches, but the process has been slow. As Tendler (2002) 
points out, ‘For all the talk of policy reforms, most donors – as funding organisations – organise their 
work around designing and funding projects. It is their modus operandi, their bread and butter. This 
“project imperative”, in turn, influences the way they define the poverty-reduction agenda, or any other 
for that matter’ (p.2).  
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This “projectised” approach to social policy is also consistent with the neo-liberal ideologies which 
have been ascendant within a number of donor agencies, particularly the World Bank, and their belief that 
state interventions to assist the poor and socially excluded should not interfere in any way with the 
workings of the market. Devereux’s analysis of safety net policies in Malawi offers a case study of the 
‘politics of needs interpretation’ in practice (2002). Malawi had embarked on its independence seeking to 
combine a pragmatic approach to the economic with an ideological commitment to the principle of 
“universalism” in state provisioning of health, education and food security, one that distinguished it from 
the colonial social policy. It allowed the expatiate-owned plantation economy it had inherited from the 
colonial period to flourish as an export-oriented sector and used the revenue obtained from it to fund its 
social vision. 
However, by the mid-eighties, Malawi faced the same problems of debt and enforced structural 
adjustment that were occurring elsewhere in Africa. By the mid-nineties it had become a highly aid-
dependent country with official development assistance making up 24 per cent of its GNP in 1998. Donor 
conditionalities led to the dismantling of the previous commitment to universalist social policy and its 
replacement by a projectised approach. The process by which this occurred in relation to the country’s 
food security policies and their reduction to a residual safety net approach is discussed in detail in 
Devereux (2002).  
Consistent with its ideological preference for reduced state involvement, the World Bank argued for a 
minimal public works programme to be located within the Malawi Social Action Fund. The government’s 
own preference was for a safety net programme which would provide the poor with some protection 
against transitory shocks and which would be located in the National Economic Commission (NEC). 
They saw the Bank’s proposal as an attempt to wrest control over what was a fundamental state 
responsibility, the coordination of the country’s safety-net efforts, away from the government and to place 
it within a Bank-funded quango. While justified on allegedly technical “common-sense” grounds, it had 
the profoundly political effect of disarticulating social need from the political responsibility to address it: 
donors were accountable to their own tax-payers back home, not to the citizens of Malawi for whose well-
being they bore no meaningful or enforceable responsibility (Devereux 2002).  
Sub-Saharan Africa also provides a number of examples of countries whose poor human 
development performance, relative to their income levels, is associated with the state’s reliance on mineral 
wealth for its revenue and with the concomitant implications for its governance structures and its 
responsiveness to its citizens. Generalising about this category of countries, Moore et al. (op cit) note that 
they tend to have ‘unusually powerful resource base, including military capacity, in comparison with 
citizens and strong incentives to build up coercive rather than consensual state apparatuses and modes of 
rule’. Many fit into what Bevan describes as “warlord regimes” which she illustrates with a discussion of 
Sierra Leone. While colonial rule here had been based, as elsewhere in Africa, on the extraction of primary 
resources, it had shifted over time from valuable tree crops to minerals so that by the 1960s, the country’s 
exports were dominated by diamonds, iron ore, bauxite and later rutile (Bevan 2001). She describes the 
dominant role played by outside interests in shaping the country’s history, including other governments in 
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the region with a stake in perpetuating conflict through support or opposition to the regimes in power; 
various private firms, both those dealing with minerals as well as with arms and mercenaries and 
international organisations, including international financial institutions. And finally, she points to the 
major human development failures which characterise these warlord regimes including civilian deaths, 
dismemberment and displacement on a massive scale as a result of ongoing conflicts. As might be 
expected, Sierra Leone was a “negative outlier” according to both 1991 and 1995 data.: Mundle, for 
instance, reports that Nepal, with a per capita income of $180 in 1991, had achieved a Human 
Development Index ranking of 152 compared to the much lower ranking of 172 achieved by Sierra Leone 
with a per capita income of $210.  
 
4.3 Sustaining social development: some lessons 
The particularities of state intervention within the processes of production and reproduction within a 
society – the extent, direction and responsiveness of the intervention – clearly play an important role in 
explaining its rate of economic growth, its human development achievements and the relationship 
between the tow. Our analysis in this section has revolved around three broad categories of countries: 
those whose human development outcomes were largely commensurate with their income levels; those 
who performed better than predicted by their income levels and those who performed worse.  
However, how a country is classified may vary between different studies for a number of reasons. 
One reason relates to differences in the reference period. For instance, Bangladesh was classified as a 
negative outlier according to the 1991 data used by Mundle but appears to have achieved levels of human 
development in line with its (still low) per capita GNP according to the 1995 data used by Moore et al. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, reported levels of human development in line with its level of per capita 
income in 1991 according to Mundle’s estimates but had slipped into the ranks of the negative outliers by 
the mid-nineties, according to Moore et al.  
On the other hand, certain countries recur periodically in studies as examples of ‘positive outliers 
while others recur as examples of “negative outliers”, suggesting that their performance has not varied a 
great deal over time. Clearly, understanding the experience of countries which shifted categories over time 
as well as those which remained consistent can yield important insights into the sustainability of the 
different strategies associated with their performances. Some insights are provided by a study by Ranis et 
al. (2000) of the performance of different countries over a period of three decades (the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980–92), and aspects of their policy choices which explained their performance.7 Their findings are 
summarised in the Table A2.5.  
They both reaffirm the relationship between economic growth and human development and suggest 
that it is mutually reinforcing in both positive and negative directions: thus some of the countries included 
                                                           
7  Using life expectancy shortfalls from a maximum of 85 years as their measure of human development 
achievement and per capita GDP growth as their measure of economic growth, they analysed cross-sectional 
data from between 35–76 developing countries (depending on data availability) over 1960s, 1970s and 1980–
1993.  
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in their study reported a “virtuous cycle” over time between human development and economic growth, 
with each reinforcing the other, while others appeared to started out or fallen into a vicious cycle with low 
levels of human development and low growth rates feeding into each other In addition, they highlight two 
other categories of countries: those which prioritised economic growth at the expense of human 
development, what they called EG-lopsided strategies, and those which prioritised human development, 
despite low rates of growth, or HD-lopsided strategies. In general, “lopsidedness” of either kind was a 
temporary condition; most countries with lop-sided strategies moved into vicious or virtuous cycles.  
Their findings suggest that very few countries had been able to go directly from vicious to virtuous 
cycle over the time period in question. However, a third of the countries which had adopted HD-lopsided 
strategies had moved onto virtuous cycle over time while those with EG-lopsided strategies all reverted to 
vicious cycle. In other words, it did not appear to be possible to move to a virtuous cycle through reliance 
on an EG-lopsided strategy ‘as this proved to be a dead end’ (p. 212). Brazil, discussed by Dreze and Sen 
as an example of the pursuit of a strategy of “unaimed opulence”, appears in this study as one of the 
countries which lapsed from EG-lopsided in the earlier years covered by the study to a vicious cycle in 
later years. Sierra Leone is another. More broadly, the study supports the conclusion that prioritising 
human development, regardless of levels of income, can provide the basis of an economically sustainable 
development strategy over time, but that prioritising economic growth at the expense of human 
development is less likely to be either socially or economically sustainable in the long run.  
Country-level analysis is necessary, of course, to understand in greater detail why different countries 
fared the way they have done over time. Examples of such analysis are to be found in some of the 
contributions to Mehrotra and Jolly (1997). The case of Cuba (not included in Ranis et al.) illustrates the 
experiences of a country that has failed to translate its HD-lopsided strategy into a virtuous development 
trajectory over time for political economy reasons, in particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union, its 
primary trade partner, and the accompanying tightening of the US trade embargo. Indeed, it faces a 
growing risk of reversal in its social gains. Sri Lanka appears in Ranis et al as a country that went from low 
levels of economic growth and social development at the start of the period covered by their study to a 
virtuous cycle of high rates of human development feeding into higher rates of growth. Alailama and 
Sanderatne (1997) discuss how it has been able to maintain its social achievements despite political 
instability, a slowly-growing economy and the diversion of resources to military expenditure.  
While South Korea is classified by Mundle as a negative outlier in 1991, Ranis et al. suggest that it has 
been characterised by a virtuous cycle throughout the period they studied. This discrepancy may reflect 
their narrower definition of human development compared to that used by Mundle. However, their 
conclusion that South Korea has used the fruits of economic growth to expand public support for 
investments in human development is supported by an examination of country-level evidence (Mehrotra 
1997). As we have noted, public health was virtually ignored in the early decades of its development. 
However, it began to assume increasing importance in public policy by the late seventies when growing 
social tensions in the wake of the oil crisis began to lead to ‘institutional wear and tear that was socially 
destabilizing’ (Amsden 1987 cited in Mehrotra et al. 1997: 280). A government subsidised health system 
34 
was put in place which help to cover those households which could not pay for medical care. Growing 
political tensions have also led to shift from the earlier conservative-authoritarian political regime to a 
democratically elected centre-left one. State commitment and capacity allowed South Korea to respond to 
the East Asian crisis by expanding social welfare coverage and benefits at a speed unprecedented in history 
(Yang 2000).  
To sum up, the findings in Ranis et al. underscore the positive “synergy” between economic growth 
and human capabilities. They also underscore the importance of public expenditures on health and 
education (particularly female education) in ensuring the translation of economic growth into human 
development achievements, while they note that domestic investment rates and income distribution have 
been significant in explaining the chain of causation from human development to economic growth. In 
addition, the study supports the importance of the sequencing of policy change for social sustainability: ‘HD 
must be strengthened before a virtuous cycle can be attained. Policy reforms which focus only on economic 
growth are unlikely to succeed’. The sequencing principle may also have to apply within human 
development policy itself: priority may need to be given to primary education and some comprehensive 
basic health care in early phase of growth. The role of science, technology and institutions of higher 
education will become more important subsequently to ensure that investments in human development 
continue to contribute to growth while investments in more expensive forms of curative care, including 
hospitals, will help to ensure that economic growth continues to contribute to human development.  
 
5  Endemic insecurity and livelihood strategies: access, marginalisation 
and exclusion 
 
5.1 Livelihood strategies and institutional access 
It will be clear from the discussion so far that there are major differences in the socio-economic contexts, 
institutional configurations and policy regimes within which individuals and groups meet their needs and 
make provision for the future. Policy regimes are clearly important in this analysis because they represent 
the extent to which the state makes a purposive effort to ensure that different groups in a society are 
protected from the risks and insecurities of their environment. This has become evident once again in 
recent decades in the responses of different countries to the new forms of insecurity which have 
accompanied economic liberalisation and the intensified pace of globalisation. Many of the OECD 
countries as well as some in East Asia have sought to defend, and often expand, public responsibility for 
social protection from the vagaries associated with growing “openness” (UNRISD 2000; Rodrik 1998). By 
contrast, the poorer countries of the world have been forced, by internal economic constraints, as well as 
pressure from the international financial institutions, to shed many aspects of state support for livelihood 
security in favour of various forms of private initiative: markets, non-governmental organisations or, 
where these have not materialised, to informal community or self-provisioning.  
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However, what differentiates the nature of insecurity in different parts of the world is not simply the 
absence or presence of particular social security measures which provide protection from the vicissitudes 
of global market forces. It is also the presence or absence of a range of functionally specialised 
institutional mechanisms, resilient in the face of crisis because they have matured over an extended period 
of time, and able to provide individuals and families with protection against a much wider class of risks 
and uncertainties than covered by public policies alone. These include highly sophisticated markets in 
financial services, including credit, savings, insurance, pensions, mortgages and so on which have 
developed alongside state provision of social security. These are in turn backed up by a range of 
institutions which provide security in its wider sense of law and order: the courts, the police, regulatory 
committees, watchdog bodies etc.  
The fact that most of these institutions function reasonably well in high and many middle-income 
countries and the fact that they are underpinned by effective states which regulate their operations, allows 
members of these societies to plan for the future with some degree of certainty. They enjoy what Giddens 
refers to as a sense of “ontological security” in their everyday lives, a confidence in the continuity of their 
self-identity and in the stability of the social and material context of their actions (1990: 92).  
The institutional configurations which characterise the poorer countries offer a very different 
environment for individuals and social groups seeking to meet their needs and secure their futures. Here, 
as elsewhere, there are episodic risks and external shocks, both of a co-variate (riots, floods, drought, 
cyclones, economic crises, war) as well as idiosyncratic kind (death of breadwinner, collapse of business 
and so on). In addition, however, there is a chronic and pervasive insecurity, one that is endemic to these 
environment in that it is generated by everyday institutional processes of society, including those related to 
upholding law and order. As Bevan (2001) puts it, ‘The unfettered pursuit of interests by powerful actors 
within the public domain is a major factor in generating insecurity in certain contexts; in others, 
insecurities may be generated by the actions of state players through the inappropriate construction and 
pursuit of policy goals’. There is little sense here of individuals exercising any control over the present, let 
alone anticipating and “provisioning” for the future.  
One consequence of this is that the personalised social networks of kin, community and clan 
continue to play a key role in the livelihood strategies of both rich and poor households. Such networks, 
which draw their legitimacy and resilience from their ability to provide for members in times of need and 
to extract the obligations to meet such needs, constitute a key source of security in contexts where 
institutional alternatives are either absent or unreliable. They have proved extremely effective in promoting 
the interests of their own members, supporting their business ventures, resolving internal disputes, and 
providing an “anchor of security” against various forms of risk in contexts where the state failed to 
guarantee basic forms of social security for all citizens (Platteau 1992).  
However, such relationships also reinforce a “limited group morality” in that the loyalty of members 
is restricted to other members of the same networks rather than extended to all sections of society. And 
because they embody highly differentiated, and unequal, principles of access, they provide very variable 
livelihood options for different social groups. Wealthy groups use their social connections to gain 
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privileged access to available resources, including those distributed by the state, on terms which increase 
private inequalities. As Platteau points out in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, the state itself is 
structured by rival networks articulated around individuals, families, religious, socio-cultural and economic 
groups, sub-groups, sects, castes etc. ‘all engaged in merciless struggles for access to power and to the 
wealth and material privileges which automatically reward the power-holders’ (p. 18).  
The result is that a few people in Africa are very rich and some others are reasonably well-off: 
‘African political elites who stay in power have achieved livelihoods that generate considerable wealth, 
often invested overseas (capital flight) and sometimes locally invested . . . There is a small middle class of 
professionals (doctors, academic, journalists etc), often with international and aid-related links’ (Bevan 
2001: 37). The majority, however, are poor, have no access to these global resources and must secure their 
livelihoods through their own efforts. A great deal of time and effort is devoted to the search for a patron 
or an economic rent or invested in strengthening social networks. As Berry has noted, ‘where access to 
land and other productive resources depends partly on non-market criteria, accumulation of cash and 
other fungible assets may not be a sufficient condition for securing access to the means of production. If 
access depends on social identity, producers will use resources to establish or reaffirm advantageous 
identities and connections for themselves (Berry 1988: 67).  
South Asian societies tend to be far more socially differentiated along class and caste lines than those 
in sub-Saharan Africa and have a much larger class of “free” landless labour. In addition, the state has 
evolved over a longer period of colonial rule and the bureaucratic apparatus has been more solidly 
implanted. Nevertheless, here too, family, kin and caste relations take primacy in social relations, even 
among the urban, educated elite who hold positions of power in modern institutions, including the state 
bureaucracy. They may agree with official institutional ideologies that access to public resources should be 
allocated on the grounds of need, merit or some other impersonal rule-based criteria, but as Kakar (1978) 
points out, they find it difficult to rid themselves of the conviction that their social identities and social 
relationships should ultimately shape their behaviour:  
 
This conflict between the rational criteria of specific tasks and institutional goals rooted in western 
societal values, and his own deeply held belief (however ambivalent) in the importance of honouring 
family and jati bonds is typical among highly educated and prominently employed Indians. And 
among the vast majority of tradition-minded countrymen – whether it be a bania bending the law to 
facilitate the business transaction of a fellow jati member, or a marwari industrialist employing an 
insufficiently qualified but distantly related job applicant as a manager, or a clerk accepting bribes in 
order to put an orphaned niece through school – dishonesty, nepotism and corruption as they are 
understood in the West are merely abstract concepts. 
(Kakar 1978: 125) 
 
The distribution of public resources on the basis of these highly personalised relationships has the effect 
of reproducing in the “public” sphere the socially ascribed inequalities of kin, family and community. 
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Urban and rural elites – the big farmers, the industrialists, the bureaucrats, the executives and 
professionals, and the intelligentsia, the majority drawn from the upper castes within society – have used 
their social networks to gain privileged access to technology, information and services to ensure that their 
private priorities take precedence over the public good (Kothari, 1993: 146).  
In Bangladesh too, family, kinship and community ties determine access to both private and public 
resources: ‘in all regimes in Bangladesh, and East Pakistan before it, the state has not been available for all, 
and its resources have been allocated intentionally or unintentionally via patronage networks stretching 
down to the village level’ where locally powerful families have successfully monopolise public sector 
resources through their links with locally influential officials (Wood 1999: 17). Public institutions, in 
general, and social policy processes in particular, cannot be relied upon in such contexts to produce 
‘equitable and predictable outcomes’ on the basis of transparent and impersonal criteria: ‘thus we enter the 
realm of personal favours and discretionary outcomes’ (Wood 1999: 18). 
 
5.2 Livelihood strategies and institutional exclusion 
In these circumstances, the struggle for livelihoods is likely to be particularly precarious for those who not 
only lack productive assets, but are also marginalised from social networks which could connect them, 
however imperfectly, to mainstream circuits of distribution. Economic disadvantage tends to be 
compounded in their case by various forms of institutional exclusion which make them vulnerable as well 
as poor, where vulnerability refers both to the likelihood of suffering from, and the capacity to withstand, 
shocks, risks, stress and various forms of “harm” (Chambers 1989; Bevan 2001) as well as to the state of 
mind engendered by this condition, the feelings of defencelessness, inability to cope, a lack of agency: the 
absence, in other words, of a sense of “ontological security”.  
For these groups, labour, often in its most literal bodily sense, is a key resource and the basis upon 
which they gain access to other kinds of resources. They too, like the better off, will seek to utilise their 
membership of informal or fictive networks of kinship, community and clan as far as possible to protect 
themselves in an environment characterised by pervasive insecurity. However, their networks tend to be 
characterised by extreme forms of clientilist dependence and its value to them is likely to be conditioned 
by the absence of other options. Breman (1996) documents how many of the younger members of low-
caste landless households in rural India are now seeking to avoid long-term attachment to higher-caste 
landowners, despite the security that this offered in the past. Instead, some choose ‘the risky but freer life 
of the day worker’ (1996: 238) while others escape to work as casual waged labour in the urban informal 
economy. They may be treated as “commodities” to be bought and sold in the market place, their 
conditions of work may entail longer hours of work or more hazardous forms of work, but they are not 
immediately identified as members of a socially despised group, as persons of lesser worth.  
Such choices highlight the point made earlier: that even for those forced to live a hand-to-mouth 
existence, there are concerns other than those related to immediate survival, concerns with security of 
livelihood, with dignity at work, with the respect of the community and so on. While these different 
concerns may, in principle, be equally valued, they tend to assume a hierarchical ordering in conditions of 
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extreme scarcity, in that that some may have to be sacrificed in order that others can be met (Chambers 
1988). The evidence suggests that, unlike the trade-offs faced by affluent sections of society, which tend to 
be between different sources of well-being (the better of two “goods”), the poor generally have to choose 
between different kinds of deprivation (the lesser of two “bads”).  
These trade-offs take a number of different forms. They are sometimes inter-temporal in nature: 
poorer households are forced to discount the future in favour of the present, pulling their children out of 
school, or failing to send them to school in the first place, because they need every member of the family 
to contribute to household survival. They can take an inter-personal form: the World Bank’s Consultations 
with the Poor reported the case of a woman in the Ukraine who had to decide which member of the 
family would eat on a particular day – herself or her son while in Tbilisi in Georgia, there were mothers 
who had had to decide which of their children to sell in order that to support the ones that remained 
(Narayan et al. 2000: 35, 38).8 
Yet other trade-offs relate to livelihood strategies themselves and the social relations they embody. 
How different livelihood options are rewarding or exploitative will vary, not only according to the 
magnitude of returns to the labour effort, but also according to the terms on which labour is utilised and 
to the conditions which led to the selection of particular livelihood options. In Botswana, only households 
who are temporarily (because of drought) or permanently without cattle (often female-headed) will hire 
out their members in what is called majako, a labour relationship characterised by poor security of 
payment: ‘Being forced into the extreme dependency of a servant relationship with a rich households 
seems to be associated with shame and is much feared’ (Koojman 1978: 243 cited in Smith 1997: 133). 
There are thus a range of options – bonded labour, prostitution, begging, sale of body organs or of 
children – which will only be adopted in situations of extreme desperation because of their implications 
for physical health and emotional well-being. As we noted, livelihood options, such as casual wage labour, 
offer and migration may offer less security than caste-based labour attachments, but they also offer 
freedom from devalued identities and personalised forms of exploitation.  
However, such freedoms are not always affordable for all. The discussion in Mendelsohn and 
Vicziany (1998) of the case of “untouchable” bonded labourers who returned to the extremely exploitative 
conditions which characterised their work in the quarrying industry in Delhi, despite a Supreme Court 
ruling which gave them their “freedom” from their bondage, testifies to the stark absence of choices that 
such marginalised groups may face. For those living close to the margins of survival, whose ability to meet 
their daily basic needs is extremely precarious, freedom may have to be traded against the security 
provided by such extreme forms of clientilist dependency.  
Such relationships give client households access to the resources they need for some minimum level 
of survival and security in exchange for resources which reinforce their patron’s dominant status in a 
variety of different ways: political or factional loyalty, muscle power in conflict, guaranteed supply of 
                                                           
8  These are in marked contrast to the kinds of tradeoffs to be found in newspaper reports on the downsizing of 
London’s financial sector in the wake of 11th September which noted that retrenched bankers would have to 
decide whether to postpone upgrading their cars or the purchase of a weekend retreat in the south of France. 
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labour in peak periods and so on (Smith 1997). Thus, in the African context, ‘in many cases the “small 
men” draw their livelihoods from participating at the lowest level in the various factions, cliques or groups 
fighting for power’ (Bayart 1989, cited in Platteau 1992: 19). In Bangladesh too, men from poor 
households make up the lathials in the rural areas and the masthans in the urban that fight battles on 
behalf of wealthy landlords or politically powerful patrons (Kabeer 2003a; Wood and Salway 2000). 
While these relationships can help to minimise threats from the multiple sources of risk that the poor 
face in their environments, they carry an alternative and major source of risk of their own: the possible 
withdrawal or foreclosure of patronage (Smith 1997). The possibility that this might happen is likely to 
have profound implications on the ability of the poor to express voice, exercise agency or claim rights. 
This is the phenomenon of power by “anticipated reaction” (Smith 1997). Dependent households attempt 
to adapt their behaviour as much as possible to the anticipated reactions of their patrons in order to pre-
empt any threat of withdrawal of support. Similarly, dependent members within households will attempt 
to mould their behaviour to the anticipated preferences of dominant members, even in the absence of any 
external pressure, because of the possibility of an adverse reaction to the failure to do so, and the 
consequences for them of such a reaction.  
 
5.3 Institutional exclusion and the “politics of needs interpretation” 
The implications of extreme forms of dependency of this kind for the “politics of needs interpretation” 
within policy processes represents the other side of the coin to the disproportionate clout exercised by the 
socially well-connected: the silence or exclusion of the poor within these processes and thus the 
reproduction of the inequalities which led to their marginal status in the first place. Economic insecurity 
translates into lack of voice and political action while the absence of voice and political participation 
contributes to the perpetuation of economic insecurity. The ramifications of these micro-level linkages 
between governance and development are apparent in some of the ways in which social policies have 
played out on the ground and the inequalities in access, quality, relevance and “fit” of the services which 
they have helped to generate (Devereux and Cook 2002).  
The uneven physical distribution of services is one route through which inequalities of access to 
social provision mirror wider social inequalities. Services of various kinds tend to be concentrated in 
locations which privilege the wealthy and well-connected: in urban rather than rural areas, or, within the 
rural context, in easily accessible rather than more isolated areas. The poor generally have to travel longer 
distances in search of services and wait longer hours for them. Data from the World Bank (2004) have 
estimated that in Bangladesh, for instance, children from the poorest fifth of the population travel an 
average of 0.2 kilometres to the nearest primary school compared to the 0.1 kilometres travelled by 
children from the richest fifth of the population and an average of 0.9 kilometres to the nearest health 
facility compared to the 0.7 kilometres travelled by children from the richest fifth of the population (ratios 
of 1.6 and 1.3 respectively). In India, the ratio of the distance to the nearest school and health facility 
travelled by individuals from the poorest fifth to the richest fifth was higher at 2.3 and 3.6. It was even 
higher in rural Nigeria where children from the poorest fifth of the population need to travel more than 
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five times further than children from the richest fifth to reach the nearest primary school and more than 
seven times further to reach the nearest health facility. 
Inequalities of “access” have a financial dimension. The imposition of user charges in public health 
provision in an attempt to achieve financial sustainability, for instance led to a decline in the national 
utilisation of health care services in Ghana from around 4.5 million in outpatient visits to 2.1 million 
within the year fees were introduced. In Swaziland, outpatient attendance in government health facilities 
fell by a third in the year following fee increase: according to Yoder (1989) up to a third of the decline was 
among the poorest patients. In Zambia, the imposition of user charges in government clinics led to those 
who could afford it to respond by switching to private clinics where they received prompt attention and 
‘value for their money. For those who could not afford it, however, the only options were to either buy 
their own remedies from the chemist ‘or else they stay at home and die’ (Booth et al. 1996: 61).  
There is also a social dimension to inequalities of access, reflecting the extent to which public service 
provision discriminates against certain categories of “users”. In India, for instance, it has been reported 
that where there were fewer doctors, nurses and teachers in districts where there were higher proportions 
of Muslims (a minority religion) and scheduled (“untouchable”) castes in the rural population and that 
health outreach workers were less likely to visit lower caste and poorer households (Betancourt and 
Gleaton 2000; Koenig et al. 2000). Scheduled caste communities were generally far less likely to have a 
school within their village than the general population: in 1986, only 38 per cent had a primary school 
within the community compared to 54 per cent of the rest of the community (Nambissan 1996).  
Public providers have also been found to often act directly as agents of social exclusion. The PROBE 
report on educational provision in India (1999) found that there were still villages where higher caste 
teachers considered children for the untouchable castes as “unfit” for education, making them sit 
separately from other children and using them to perform menial chores. Studies from sub-Saharan Africa 
highlight the sexual harassment of girls as a key factor in explaining gender inequalities in educational 
attainment, with male teacher emerging as the main perpetrators (Leach and Machakanja 2000; Mensch 
and Lloyd 1997). The studies point out that sexual harassment was treated, along with corporal 
punishment, verbal abuse and bullying as “inevitable” aspects of school life, a manifestation of unequal 
gender relationships and of the authoritarian ethos of the educational hierarchy.  
In rural Nigeria, uneducated women are often afraid to deliver in hospitals because of the rough 
treatment they received at the hands of nurses, treatment that was not meted out to better-educated 
women (Okojie 1993, cited in Jejeebhoy 1995: 110). Focus group members in South Africa commented 
about primary health care providers: ‘Sometimes I feel as if apartheid has never left this place . . . They 
really have a way of making you feel like you are a piece of rubbish’ (Schneider and Palmer 2002). In 
Bangladesh, a study by Schuler and Hossain (1998) pointed out how interactions between rural women 
and family planning service providers took on the hierarchical character which was a hallmark of relations 
of patronage in the wider community.  
Unevenness in the quality of services on offer play a role in reproducing wider social inequalities. 
Studies of high drop out rates among children from poorer or from lower caste households in India point 
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to the “deplorable” conditions of many of their the schools in terms of the adequacy of the buildings, the 
ratio of teachers to students, the number of toilets, and availability of separate toilets for girls, the 
availability of seating, the supply of text books and so on. Random samples of school and health clinics in 
a number of developing countries found absence rates of over 40 per cent among officials, with higher 
rates in more remote and poorer areas (WDR 2004). 
Finally, the “responsiveness” of public services to the needs of those who lack voice will also 
determine the extent to which public provision serves to counter or reinforce social inequality. 
Responsiveness includes the relevance of services. Talib’s study of educational performance among 
children of low caste stone quarry workers in Delhi notes that, along with the indifference of teachers, 
most of whom came from higher castes, to the needs of the students, the irrelevance of the curriculum 
also contributed to poor outcomes. Children were expected memorize the biographies of reputed but 
remote figures as Madame Curie, Acharya Vinoba Bhave, Thomas Edison, Albert Schwitzer, Gautama 
Buddha, Confucius, Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci; the underlying ideological message of which served 
to reinforce the superiority and the efficacy of mind over body and intellectual lover manual labour. ‘To 
those who were born and brought up to do menial tasks, these biographies at best inspired awe and at 
worst instilled inadequacy in the self’. The failure of most of the children to recall anything that they had 
been taught in the classroom was hardly surprising.  
Responsiveness also includes the “fit” between the services on offer and the livelihood systems, 
activities and constraints of the poor and vulnerable (Devereux and Cook 2002). The WDR 2004 offers 
some illustrative examples. It was found that infrequent and inconvenient operating hours of health 
facilities greater reduced their use: according to focus group respondents, ‘Health posts operate only twice 
a week. Waiting time is three hours on average. Only those who arrive by 8 am get a consultation’. (p. 25). 
In parts of Africa, schools often begin at 8 am at a time when girls are still fetching water and school 
holidays are at odds with local market dates.  
Behind these various categories of failure in the public provision of social services lies a cross-cutting 
failure of accountability: the absence or weakness of institutionalised route through which public officials 
responsible for making and implementing policy could be assessed on their performance by those they are 
supposed to serve and required to make appropriate changes in their behaviour. The disproportionate 
effects of this for the poor is documented in the Consultations with the Poor carried out by the World 
Bank:  
 
From the perspective of poor people worldwide, there is a deep and widespread crisis in governance. 
While the range of institutions that play important roles in poor people’s lives is vast, poor people are 
excluded from participation in governance. State institutions, whether represented by central 
ministries or local governments, are often neither responsive nor accountable to the poor; rather, the 
reports detail the arrogance and the disdain with which poor people are treated. Poor people see little 
recourse to injustice, criminality, abuse and corruption in their interaction with institutions. 
(Narayan et al. 2000: 197) 
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Such findings clearly point to the need for reform of public sector provision. However, to conclude, as 
neo-liberal policy-makers within international and national agencies have done, that that public provision 
should be replaced by the market fails to take account of problems associated with market provision 
which gave rise to state intervention in the first place. Certainly there is evidence that private provision is 
often perceived to offer better value for money and greater accountability to customer, but it is also 
markedly less equitable. In Zambia, as we saw, the deterioration in government services meant that many 
turned to private clinics. However, this option was open only to those who could afford it: ‘the poor stay 
at home and die’. The problem of markets as a means for meeting social need is summarised by Harriss-
White (1999a): ‘Markets exclude . . . Markets, even idealised, abstract, efficient ones, respond to demand 
rather than to human needs and guarantee neither life nor welfare. For these, the state is a necessary – but 
not a sufficient – guarantor’.  
The state remains necessary because it is the only institution that is obliged to respond to claims for 
welfare entitlements – unlike either markets or non-governmental organisations. However, it is clearly not 
sufficient because, as the evidence cited in this paper suggests, it has not always proved responsive to these 
claims. It is therefore important to ask to what extent this lack of responsiveness is inevitable. Many of the 
examples of mis-behaviour by public officials described here can be seen as arrogance on the part of the 
relatively privileged towards those less powerful than themselves. What is not clear is why the public 
institutions in which they work appear to condone or even actively promote such behaviour. In other 
words, the domain of the explanation must encompass the workings of public institutions, and the 
incentive structures that they embody, as much as the social backgrounds and individual preferences of 
public officials.  
For instance, while the PROBE report on educational provision in India offers a fairly damning 
indictment of the teachers within government schools it also suggests that their poor performance was at 
least partly a reflection of the badly-resourced conditions under which they had to teach. Schools were 
found to be ‘under-equipped, under-funded, under-staffed and over-crowded’: such are the working 
conditions . . . that most teachers, of necessity, would find them tough, and even the most committed 
teacher could find his or her enthusiasm waning’ (p. 58). Not only did the educational system succeed in 
mainly attracting poorly motivated individuals, the report also suggests that its recruitment processes may 
have actively deterred those with a genuine vocation for teaching since anyone with right formal 
qualifications, the right connections or the ability to pay the necessary bribe could become a teacher. On 
the other hand, while private schools were considered better value for money, Kingdon (1996) found that 
they were disproportionately attended by the children from wealthy rather than poor households, from 
upper rather than lower castes, from majority rather than minority religions and boys rather than girls.  
In rural Uganda, Lucas and Nuwagaba (1999) noted the degree of discretion permitted to health staff, 
and the absence of monitoring mechanisms, gave health staff considerable leeway in deciding on charging 
practices, credit arrangements and qualification for payment exemption. They were able to use various 
forms of corruption and illicit practices to top up their earnings. Not surprisingly, they were regarded with 
suspicion by members of the community who complained that the quality of care at public facilities 
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depended on the amount offered for treatment. At the same time, however, the study points to the 
extremely low salaries that public providers received as part of the explanation for their behaviour. They 
had the incentive to seek to supplement their incomes in whatever way they could and the system of 
district health management gave them the opportunity to do so.  
The structure of incentives (implicit as well as explicit) embodied by the institutions of public 
provision thus plays an important role in explaining why they so often discriminate against those who are 
already marginalised. Equally, however, it should be possible to restructure public institutions to promote 
greater responsiveness on the part of public providers to the needs of the excluded. Unfortunately, as 
Tendler and Freedheim (1994) point out, the neo-liberal critique of the rent-seeking state has led to a 
policy preoccupation with situations of government failure. There has not been equivalent attention to 
situations in which governments have managed to win the “trust” of their various constituencies and have 
achieved creditable results. Such analysis might offer ways of thinking about public sector reform other 
than the downsizing and privatisation favoured by the neo-liberal agenda.  
Their own analysis of a health programme in north-eastern Brazil suggests the use of material as well 
as non-material incentives to promote responsive behaviour on the part of public service providers in a 
context long characterised by extreme structural inequality. A combination of central responsibility for 
certain aspects of the programme (recruitment of the front line providers on merit principles) and 
decentralisation of others (funding and recruitment of supervisors) helped to counter the patronage 
dynamic in local politics which had helped to skupper past attempts at community development. Using its 
knowledge of the local, the state was able to create an unusual sense of “calling” among its workers, give 
them the incentive to build relationships of trust with their communities and provide the community with 
the information it needed to hold providers accountable.  
Elsewhere, in China, study of local-level health provision points to the importance – and resilience – 
of internalised “values” in explaining observed behaviour. Here the transition to a “market socialist” 
economy has been accompanied by devolution of management of the health system to localised health 
facilities which generate their own revenue. Health workers employ a variety of legal and illicit strategies to 
augment low basic government salaries: through “gifts” of cash or kind from patients, legal and illegal 
kickbacks from suppliers of drugs, equipment and services (Bloom et al. 2000). All this resembles the 
picture of local health provision in other parts of the developing world. What is unusual, however, is 
evidence that many village health workers continue to participate in the preventive health programmes and 
to see poor patients in spite of changes in the system of payment which made these less remunerative 
activities. Values internalised in an earlier “service-oriented” era continue to shape their behaviour, despite 
overall changes. The challenge, as the authors point out, is how to retain this commitment to a “culture of 
inclusiveness” in service provision: ‘it is hard to predict how long attitudes formed in an environment 
which emphasised social responsibility will persist as marketisation continues and inequalities grow’ 
(p. 14). 
Van Damme and Meessen, (2001; cited in Booth and Lucas 2002) provide an example from the 
Cambodian context of how an appreciation of institutional incentives and constraints was used to improve 
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systems of provision. Here various forms of unruly practices engaged in by health providers were traced to 
poor staff motivation and the absence of any incentive to monitor their performance. With the agreement 
of the Ministry of Health, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) introduced a performance-based salary system 
covering the hospital, health centres, and the district administration. They asked all staff members how 
much they would need to be paid in order to do their jobs as specified in their contracts. They then used 
anonymous voting to negotiate a bonus-for-service-delivery package which would be agreeable to the great 
majority. Given the low level of government salaries, these bonus payments became the most important 
component of staff incomes.  
A system was also put in placed to monitor compliance with the new contracts. Each component of 
the district health service – hospital, health centre, administrative office –established an elected committee 
which took responsibility for monitoring and ensuring contract compliance by the staff within their units. 
While some bonus payments were based on personal performance, others were based on the collective 
performance of the unit, including fulfilment of its monitoring, reporting and supervisory duties. Annual 
audits, spot checks by local consultants and exit surveys of users were used to confirm that this activity 
was appropriately carried out. The exercise, now in its second year, appears to have achieved a remarkable 
breakthrough in circumstances where previous reform attempts have made little impression. Its key 
elements of contracting, collective responsibility and “supervising the supervisors” offer interesting 
possibilities for reforming public delivery systems that have not featured prominently in the neo-liberal 
privatisation agenda.  
 
6  Revisioning “the social”: citizen-centred social policy for the poor in 
poor countries 
 
6.1 Re-visioning “the social”: clients, customers and citizens 
This paper started with the recognition that development policies in the poorer countries of the world 
have not always served the interests of the poor. Introduced during the colonial era, and retained with 
some modifications in the post-colonial era, such policies embodied a vision of “the social” which 
reflected an imported future rather than a response to the problems and possibilities of the present. They 
expressed a commitment to the principle of universalism but prioritised forms of provision which had 
been developed for urbanised workers in the formal labour markets of rich industrialised countries. In 
contexts where the vast majority of people were poor, lived in rural areas and were only weakly linked to 
the formal sector, the commitment to universality was quickly compromised by gaps between what was 
needed, what could be afforded and what was provided. Those who benefited from these policies, a 
privileged enclave of organised sector workers and employees and the ministries that served them, 
developed a vested interest in maintaining this status quo and resisting attempts at change.  
State-centred approaches to social policy gave way in the 1980s to market-centred approaches which 
sought to privatise social services in the interests of economic efficiency and financial sustainability. 
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However, while private provision has proved more efficient and financially sustainable in some contexts, 
and more accountable to its users in others, markets have proved even less effective than the state in 
reaching the poor in most contexts. Indeed, where inequalities are deeply entrenched in the social 
structure, both state-centred and market-centred approaches have had the effect of reinforcing, rather 
than dissolving, pre-existing inequalities; the state because it responded primarily to those with political 
clout and the market because it serves only those with purchasing power.  
In contrast with these dichotomised approaches, the emerging discourse on welfare pluralism allows 
for the possibility of a division of roles and responsibilities in the financing, planning, delivering, 
monitoring and regulation of services between different institutional actors. This has to be welcomed on a 
number of grounds. First, it provides a better approximation of the reality on the ground in most 
developing country context, the actual ways in which people have sought to provide for themselves. And 
secondly, it opens up a space for thinking about the “comparative advantages” of different institutional 
actors and possible “returns to synergy” based on various models of collaboration (Robinson and White 
1997). However, the particular vision of “the social” which underpins different policy discourses of 
welfare pluralism has important ramifications for how it is translated into practice.  
There is, as we noted earlier, a neo-liberal vision of “the social” which continues to dominate 
international development discourse and to exercise a powerful influence on national policies in both 
wealthy and poor countries. Summarised in Thatcher’s famous aphorism ‘there is no society, there are only 
individuals and families’, it is based on the belief that individuals and families are motivated by self-
interest; that they should be given the freedom to pursue this self-interest through their own private 
efforts; and that the market is the optimal institutional arrangement to guarantee such freedom. This 
notion of choice as “negative freedom”, the absence of restraints, has always been a leitmotif of 
mainstream liberal economics but it has been reinforced in recent decades by forms of analysis which 
attribute a “rent-seeking” character to all forms of collective action (welfare states, labour unions, 
producer cartels) which interfere with the workings of the market which is seen as the only institution 
compatible with freedom of choice (Olsen 1982).  
However, “community participation”, including participation by non-governmental organisations, is 
one category of collective action which is considered to be compatible with the neo-liberal approach to 
welfare pluralism because it seen to represent principles of voluntarism and “self-help” on the part of the 
community in question. Community participation is thus permitted, and even welcomed, in a variety of 
various activities, such as the construction of facilities, contribution of material inputs, co-operative 
mechanisms to finance drug-purchases and provision of unpaid labour, and provides a “cost-effective” 
route to services which are intended to benefit the community itself.  
This vision of welfare pluralism offers out a “residualist” approach to social policy: it positions 
individuals and families as consumers and customers who choose between an array of market-based 
providers with the state assigned the role of provider of last resort for those whose lack of purchasing 
power prevents them from exercising individual choice. It is not, however, an inclusive vision. Inequalities 
in access to market-provided services have tended to faithfully mirror inequalities in the distribution of 
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wealth and income in the wider society and appear to be widening further with the opening up of global 
markets. Declining state provision has “enticed” the middle classes of developing and transitional 
economies into these global markets for health, education and insurance, undermining the potential for a 
cross-class (re)construction of a social contract between the state and citizens which could help to 
underwrite equality of access to the means of basic needs satisfaction (Deacon 2000). The state provision 
of services specifically targeted to the poor has generally proven to be “poor services” in the absence of 
such cross-class support (Deacon 2000) while community participation initiatives have raised concerns 
about issues of equity, both in terms of where the burden of contribution falls as well as their implications 
for access to services (Cornwall 2000).  
There is, however, an alternative vision of “the social” associated with welfare pluralism which 
positions individuals as citizens rather than consumers, members of wider collectivities, in which “rights”, 
and correlative duties, are the basis on which access is premised. Rights differ fundamentally from other 
forms of access which may prevail in a society, such as charity, status, discretion or purchasing power: they 
are universal in that they are enjoyed by virtue of the inherent dignity of the human being and they are 
mutually reciprocal in that the rights of each individual must be respected by all.  
However, while the values of human dignity, and collective responsibility for upholding these values, 
command considerable consensus in the international arena, the current international framework of rights 
does not. Civil and political rights continue to command greater support than economic, social and 
cultural rights at the international level, particularly among the world’s richer countries. They are seen to 
have greater resonance with the idea of negative freedom within mainstream liberal philosophy and greater 
compatibility with market-led development. Economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand, which 
provide the foundations for the exercise of “positive” freedom, the ability to exercise agency free from 
deprivation and discrimination, are seen to entail a greater claim on collective resources and require a role 
for the state which is incompatible with the “minimalist state” envisaged in the neo-liberal agenda. The 
international rights framework, with its implicit hierarchy of rights, is therefore seen by many of the 
world’s poorer countries as a reflection of western values and priorities, unlikely to become truly universal 
until it embodies values and priorities of the different cultures of the world (Nyamu-Musembi 2002).  
This debate is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. However, “actor orientated 
approaches” to the question of rights allow us to sidestep the legalistic preoccupation with pre-determined 
bundles of rights to a different view of citizenship as the engagement in – and product – of collective 
forms of struggle against injustice (Nyamu-Musembi op. cit). Dagnino (1998), for instance, points to new 
notions of citizenship that had been thrown up by social movements in Latin America, a region marked by 
extreme forms of social inequality. These sought to redefine the idea of rights from the viewpoint of the 
socially excluded so that citizenship was not defined by, and curtailed to the legal provision of rights, to 
accessing previously defined rights, to the implementation of abstract, formal rights or to various other 
strategies for inclusion into a predetermined political mainstream. Citizenship started instead with the 
conception of “the right to have rights” and extended to the fundamental right of people to participate in 
deciding the kind of society they wanted to live in:  
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In this sense, the very determination of the meaning of “right” and the assertion of some value or 
ideal as a “right” are themselves objects of political struggle . . . The new citizenship requires the 
constitution of active social subjects, defining what they consider to be their rights, and struggling for 
their recognition; it is even thought of as consisting of this process (p. 51). 
 
Mamdani stresses that it is the struggle for justice by poor and marginalised groups in the face of 
deprivation and oppression that helps to define rights and gives a universalist meaning within an evolving 
framework of citizenship:  
 
Without the experience of sickness, there can be no idea of health. And without the fact of 
oppression, there can be no practice of resistance and no notion of rights . . . Wherever there was 
(and is) oppression – and Europe had no monopoly over oppression in history– there must come 
into being a conception of rights. 
(Mamdani 1989: 1–2) 
 
And writing in the very different context of northern Ireland, Lister also emphasises the ability to exercise 
agency, and to participate in shaping the collective vision of “the social”, as the defining feature of rights 
and citizenship:  
 
. . . the right of participation in decision-making in social, economic, cultural and political life should 
be included in the nexus of basic human rights . . . Citizenship as participation can be seen as 
representing an expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined; citizenship as 
rights enables people to act as agents. 
(1998: 228) 
 
Such actor-oriented approaches promote an understanding of rights which resonates with our focus on 
human capabilities: rights provide the framework in which human capabilities can flourish. Actor-oriented 
perspectives also promote an understanding of rights which help to reconcile the commitment to 
universalism with the particularities of context. Rights are universal in that the experience of, and 
resistance to, poverty and injustice is universal; however, the situated nature of these struggles means that 
rights will always be instantiated, or given substance, in context-specific ways. 
From an actor-oriented perspective, therefore, the emerging focus on welfare pluralism has the 
advantage of opening up a space to explore the meaning of a citizen-centred social policy that is not 
hampered by an ideologically-driven adherence to either state-centred or market-centred solutions. It is 
distinguished instead by a particular vision of “the social” as constituted by principles of mutual 
reciprocity between the members of a society and by the willingness to consider a range of institutional 
configurations in implementing this vision. It would take the commitment to universality of access as its 
starting point but does not conflate it with uniformity of provision. And finally, given the centrality of 
agency in defining the meaning of rights and giving them substance, a citizen-centred social policy would 
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give this practical expression by actively promoting the ability of all sections of society to participate in 
deciding the kind of society they want for themselves and for their children, and in delineating the role 
that public policy should play in bringing it about. This would imply different things at different levels.  
 
6.2 Towards citizen-centred social policy at the local level 
At the local level, it would imply understanding patterns of exclusion and marginalisation within prevailing 
institutional configurations of social provisioning and exploring ways of tackling their underlying causes. 
There is a growing “technical” literature on the different forms taken by welfare pluralism in different 
contexts and the lessons these offer for new ways of thinking about the planning, financing and delivery of 
social services. From the point of view of inclusive citizenship, however, there are also other kinds of 
lessons which need to be learnt from these experiences in terms of the kinds of access they offer poor and 
marginalised groups, the opportunities they provide for articulating “voice” and what can be done to 
strengthen the accountability mechanisms through which different providers are made responsive to these 
groups.  
There is considerable consensus in policy circles on the need to reform the public provision of social 
services but far less consensus on what the nature of this reform should be. This is to be expected, given 
the existence of competing visions of the social and of the role ascribed to the state within them. The 
literature on new forms of public management (NPM) has been extremely influential within the neo-liberal 
agenda for public sector reform because its stress on principles of consumer choice, competitiveness and 
efficiency provide a neat counterpoint to the neo-liberal critique of the rent-seeking state, its corruption, 
unwieldiness, inefficiency and red tape. The state’s role in this version of welfare pluralism is one of 
protective regulation and coordination in contexts where ‘an increasing array of commercial agents, local 
or trans-national, become more influential and seductive in their offers to provide private pensions, health 
insurance, health treatment, education and security’ (Moore 2000: 29). In addition, the state is charged 
with a residual role in providing assistance to those unable to afford privatised social services.  
From a citizen-centred perspective, however, there is further important rationale for the role of the 
state which relates to the fact that it is the only institution which has the capacity, however imperfect, to 
side-step or bulldoze the disempowering relations of market and custom (Harris-White 1999b). Public 
sector reform which is concerned with (re)capacitating the state to fulfil this role is clearly likely to vary 
considerably from an agenda which is merely concerned with curbing its “rent-seeking” tendencies. The 
analysis of experiences of states that have performed well in terms of social development outcomes has 
underscored the importance of active public policy in achieving the social sustainability of economic 
growth. In addition, such analysis has also suggested that state involvement in the provision of basic social 
services may be the best way to tackle persisting forms of social exclusion (Mwabu et al. 2000; Robinson 
and White 1997; Mehrotra and Jolly 1997; Zuckerman and de Kadt 1997). It points out that the 
devolution of local government would help to promote state responsiveness by securing the flow of 
information necessary to match supply and demand. However, such devolution is likely to lead to greater 
equity of outcomes if it involves individuals and communities as stakeholders As Mackintosh (1998) 
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comments, social provision is most effective in meeting social need when it is reflects a collaboration 
between those who produce, and those who use, particular services. Community participation in this view 
of welfare pluralism is thus not merely a mechanism for downloading social responsibilities to the 
voluntary sector but also a means of securing greater transparency, responsiveness and accountability from 
service providers. Community participation of this kind would require the construction of long-term 
relationships of trust and solidarity at the local level between concerned actors.  
However, it is important to bear in mind that “the community” can be as much a site of social 
exclusion as the rent-seeking state (Mackintosh 1998). The hierarchical and exclusionary tendencies of 
community-based networks would have to be actively struggled against through purposive efforts to build 
the collective capabilities of excluded groups to exercise “voice” on their own behalf. Goetz and Gaventa 
(2001) document concrete instances of such actions by civil society organisations from different parts of 
the world, actions which constitute “citizen-led” movements to democratise the politics of needs 
interpretation within the policy process. Cornwall (2000) touches on some of the ways in which the new 
discourse of participation within development has been used in different contexts to lever open “policy 
spaces” for public involvement in various aspects of decision-making: prescriptions advocated for state 
reform; consultations over policy directions; direct participation by user groups in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of local public goods and services. Other studies provide more detailed 
accounts of strategies used by civil society organisations to empower poor and excluded groups to act on 
their own behalf (Kabeer 2003b; Jenkins and Goetz 1999). 
Grassroots activism of this kind is clearly important in building up the capacity of excluded groups to 
participate in the policy processes which affect their lives. However, such action does not operate 
independently of the state that it seeks to influence (Goetz and Gaventa 2001). The political structures 
which characterise different regimes of social reproduction, the vision of “the social” conveyed through 
their policy discourse, the political spaces for civic action associated with them and the state’s willingness 
and capacity to respond to its different constituencies all help to shape the forms of collective action that 
citizens can engage in. The importance of the state in enabling and shaping such activism suggests that the 
process of public sector reform should be used as far as possible to build commitment to greater 
accountability and to inclusive citizenship within the state itself: ‘if the social divisions are not narrower 
within public institutions than elsewhere, then the state’s capacity to promote social inclusion is likely to 
be small’ (Mackintosh 1998: 22). 
This would require the institutionalisation of incentive structures which promoted the recognition, 
reward and development of the capacities of front line staff in the greater responsiveness to the poor. It is, 
in the final analysis, their interactions with the community which determine the kind of signals that are 
provided by the public sector to privileged and excluded groups. Such an approach to public sector reform 
draws on a very different tradition within the literature on organisational management to that drawn on by 
the NPM. It is a tradition that is organised around values of ‘honesty, fairness and mutuality’ and seeks to 
evaluate the performance of providers on the basis of public trust and the ability to exercise citizenship 
effectively. While the institutional arrangements associated with the promotion of these values may 
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overlap to some extent with those which seek to promote competitiveness and efficiency, there are also 
likely to be trade-offs. Where trade-off exist, the grounds on which choices are made, and the balance 
between technical and political considerations, should be the result of transparent and consultative 
processes.  
However, there is more to a citizen-centred social policy than the reform of public services. Rights 
imply correlative duties and the state is, in the first instance, the repository of these duties. It has an 
obligation to respect rights (refrain from actions which infringe rights), to protect rights (prevent other 
from infringing rights) and to fulfil rights (take actions which facilitate and promote the realisation of 
rights). Such obligations entail resources (Tomasevski 1993). As far as social policy is concerned, where 
individuals and families are unable to meet their own basic needs through their own efforts, the duty to 
ensure these needs are met falls to their governments. A state concerned with the promotion of a citizen-
centred social policy thus has an obligation to mobilise the resources necessary to ensure its 
implementation. The fiscal politics of needs interpretation will thus play an important role in defining the 
nature of state’s social contract with its citizens and the vision of “the social” which it promotes. Public 
revenue is one element of this politics, public expenditure is the other.  
On the revenue side, greater state dependence on internal tax payers helps to build the infrastructural 
relationship between state and citizens, to ensure greater demand for accountability and to “nationalise” 
efforts to address poverty and exclusion (Moore 2001). It also helps to finance the commitment to 
universalism which distinguishes the state from other institutional actors in a society. However, taxation 
has to both be progressive and visible if it is to embody the idea of a social contract. By this criteria, 
income tax is both more visible than payroll or value-added tax in the sense that citizens are aware of its 
burden and it can be made progressive (Birdsall 2002). On the expenditure side, the percentage of the 
public budget that is devoted to social expenditure and the sequencing of this expenditure to reflect local 
conditions have been identified as critical in operationalising the commitment to universalism.  
Finally, the promotion of a citizen-centered social policy rests on the practice of “good governance”. 
As Chen and Desai (1997) point out, good governance in relation to social policy does not necessarily 
imply multi-party democratic system with universal franchise – although such systems do often perform 
better than others. Nor, as we noted earlier, does it refer to how well states perform from the standpoint 
of the international business community; indeed, how well they perform from this standpoint appears to 
be inversely related to how well they perform from the point of view of their citizens. Rather, “good 
governance” from the social policy perspective refers to how responsive a political regime is to the needs 
and wishes of its people, how ‘caring about their welfare in a wide sense’ (Chen and Desai 1997: 423). The 
quality of a government’s performance – ‘its professionalism, pragmatism and intolerance of corruption’ – 
is at least as, if not more, important as its political declarations and progressive stances since it determines 
how effectively the government is able to deliver on the visions that it espouses. Respect for the rule of 
law and mechanisms of democratic accountability to their citizens are all essential if governments are to 
earn the trust and co-operation of citizens (Moore 2001). They need to obey their own laws, monitor their 
own agencies effectively and provide information to the public about their rights and responsibilities. They 
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need to tax their citizens in clear and transparent ways and to use the revenue to build the cross-group 
solidarity that is essential component of “the social” envisioned by a rights-based approach.  
 
6.3 Towards citizen-centred social policy at the global level 
There is considerable scope for re-visioning “the social” from a rights-based perspective within the 
context of national policies and for drawing on national resources to do so. However, where national 
resources do not prove sufficient, the responsibility falls on the international community and must draw 
on the resources of the wealthier countries of the world, the majority of whose citizens have standards of 
living well beyond that of meeting basic needs. Development assistance can be seen as an 
acknowledgement of this obligation.  
Development assistance is, in principle, different from other forms of interaction between rich and 
poor countries (Tomaskevsi 1993). Foreign investment strategies and trade agreements reflect the logic of 
profit maximisation, even where this may entail the denial, or uneven observation, of human rights. 
Current discourses about corporate social responsibility, ethical trade agreements and core labour 
standards reflect various attempts to discourage such behaviour. However, development assistance is 
fundamentally different in its orientation: it is a branch of public policy, not commercial strategy, and its 
declared aim is development, not profit. In principle, therefore, it should seek to make a difference on issues, 
and in countries, which have failed to attract private capital flows (Tomasevski 1993). In practice, of 
course, development assistance is far from adequate. Table A2.6 which reports on per capita GNP of 
some of the richest and poorest countries in the world, and percentage of GNP by the former which is 
provided in foreign assistance to the latter, provides a measure of this failure.  
However, development assistance is only one element in the increasingly multi-stranded relationships 
between rich and poor countries in the world. Globalisation has brought with it many other interactions, 
some intended, such as trade, foreign direct investment, capital transfers and deregulation of markets, and 
others unintended: the periodic crises generated by volatile flows of financial capital across the global 
economy; the growing contradiction between the sustainability of the environment and the principles of 
the market place; and the reduction of labour once again to the status of “commodity” as countries engage 
in an apparent ‘race to the welfare bottom’ in their attempts to compete for global capital. The radical 
nature of these changes have led a number of writers to describe the current phase of globalisation as the 
‘second great transformation’ (Standing 1999; Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara 1994; Munck 2002; Harriss 
2000). Certainly Polyani’s analysis of the destructive effects of unregulated markets in labour, capital and 
natural resources in the early period of industrialisation is uncannily prophetic on the problems faced by 
the global community today: 
 
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural 
environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power would result in the 
demolition of society. For the alleged commodity “labor power” cannot be shoved about, used 
indiscriminately or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be 
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the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man’s labour power the system would, 
incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity “man” attached to that tag. 
Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the 
effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, 
perversion, crime and starvation. 
Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighbourhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers 
polluted, military safety jeopardised, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, 
the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for 
shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in 
primitive society (p.73). 
 
It is clear that any attempts to regulate financial markets, to rescue labour from the status of commodity 
and to promote the stewardship of the environment needs a holistic model of the global economy that 
encompasses its multiple inter-connections. There is evidence that this is being recognised although 
progress is slow. There has been increasing attention to the development of a more robust framework of 
global governance than presently exists. Attempts are being made to draw up the basic principles of a 
global social policy. Global labour standards, the restructuring of world debt, the possibilities for 
international taxation, including taxation to control short-term capital speculation, the promotion of 
universal access to basic social services have all featured in these discussions (Ferguson 1999; Norton and 
Conlyn 2000; Norton 2000; Deacon 2000). Globalisation has also generated a trans-national activism 
bringing together sections of civil societies from different countries who share a similar vision of “the 
social”. The anti-globalisation movement is the most visible manifestation of this and it has played an 
important role in publicizing some of the human and environmental costs associated with unregulated 
global markets. In addition, there are other less publicised networks seeking to build global coalitions 
around human rights, labour standards, HIV-AIDS, environmental issues, aid and trade policies, 
international debt and so on (Edwards and Gaventa 2001). 
Whatever form a future global social policy might take, and regardless of whether it comes about as a 
result of policy activism “from below” or policy design “from above”, it has to be premised on an analysis 
of global processes of social reproduction and the extent to which these challenge or reinforce global 
social inequalities. We will conclude this paper by noting one recent attempt to provide this more 
comprehensive picture. The newly created Commitment to Development Index (Foreign Policy 2003; 
Birdsall and Roodman 2003) ranks 21 of the richer countries of the world according to their contributions 
to “good” development through various aspects of their policies, not only those directly associated with 
aid, but also policies related to trade, environment, peacekeeping, migration and investment (see 
explanation of each of these components in Annex 3).  
Like any composite measurement of complex phenomena, the CDI can be challenged. However, it 
does succeed in drawing attention to some of the different ways in which global inequalities play out in the 
relationships between rich and poor countries than a focus on aid flows alone can provide. The report on 
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the findings of the first attempt to calculate the CDI points out that while seven nations (the G7), often 
referred to as the seven leading industrial nations, account for two-thirds of the world’s GNP, they do not 
lead in tackling global inequality. The sheer size of their economies mean that they engage in more trade, 
give more for aid and peacekeeping and generate more pollution than other nations – but they are also 
least likely to use their enormous potential to promote the interests of poorer countries. Only Germany 
among the G7 countries is firmly among the top half performers while the USA and Japan, the largest aid 
givers in absolute terms, rank last in terms of their overall policies.  
As the report suggests, there are at least two grounds why this state of affairs needs to be challenged. 
First of all, such a challenge has intrinsic value: ‘helping impoverished people worldwide to build better 
lives is the right thing to do’. Secondly, however, there are also pragmatic grounds: ‘what rich countries do 
to and for the rest of the world comes back to affect them – poverty and instability do not respect 
borders’. Now more than ever, the increase in illegal immigration, the trafficking in human beings, the 
global trade in drugs, the spread of cross-border conflicts and the rising tide of terrorism present a 
powerful challenge those who enjoy the freedom and affluence of life in the world’s richest countries ‘to 
ponder their place and purpose in the larger world’. The richer countries of the world need to assume the 
obligations commensurate with their size, power and economic might. Amongst other things, this would 
mean:  
 
reforming all their policies with an eye toward aiding development – as a matter of both morality and 
enlightened self-interest. These nations’ steady progress on the measures included in the CDI could 
inspire other rich nations to follow suit. If the richest of the rich do not lead, then no one will. But if 
these countries do step forward, then they will help to improve the lives of millions of people who 
deserve better than they have now –  while building a more stable world in the process.  
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Table A1.3 Distribution of the workforce by employment status 
% distribution of the labour force by status in employment 
Wage and salaried 
workers 
Self-employed 
workers 
Contributing family 
workers 
 
F M F M F M 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 9 15 8 43 77 17 
Pakistan 25 35 14 47 62 17 
Sri Lanka 68 60 16 34 16 6 
East Asia 
Rep of Korea 60 65 20 34 20 2 
Southern Africa 
Botswana 59 65 8 5 16 18 
Namibia 36 60 20 16 28 10 
South Africa 70 78 5 8   
OECD Countries 
Australia 88 83 11 17 1 1 
Canada 90 88 9 12 1 0 
Denmark 95 88 6 12 0 0 
Germany 92 87 6 13 2 0 
Italy 77 68 17 29 7 3 
Norway 95 89 4 11 1 0 
Sweden 94 85 5 15 1 0 
United Kingdom 92 83 7 17 1 0 
United States 93 91 6 10 0 0 
 
Source: The World’s Women 2000, UN Statistics Division 
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Table A1.4 Urbanisation 
Urban population Population in urban 
agglomerations of more than one 
million 
Millions % of total 
population 
% of total population 
 
1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 2000 2015 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 12.5 30.6 14 24 6 13 18 
India 158.8 280.1 23 28 8 10 12 
Pakistan 23.2 49.1 28 36 15 21 25 
Sri Lanka 3.2 4.4 22 23    
East Asia 
China 192.3 396.4 20 32 13 14 17 
Rep of Korea 21.7 38.0 57 81 40 47 45 
Southern Africa 
Botswana 0.1 0.8 15 50    
Malawi 0.6 2.5 9 24    
Mozambique 1.6 6.7 13 39 6 17 21 
Namibia 0.2 0.5 23 30    
South Africa 13.3 21.1 48 50 27 32 36 
Zambia 2.3 3.9 40 40 9 16 22 
Zimbabwe 1.6 4.1 22 35 9 14 20 
OECD Countries 
Australia 12.6 16.1 86 85 61 56 55 
Canada 18.6 23.5 76 77 32 37 38 
Denmark 4.3 4.5 84 85 27 26 26 
France 39.5 44.2 73 75 21 21 20 
Germany 64.7 71.7 83 87 39 41 43 
Italy 37.6 38.6 67 67 24 19 21 
Norway 2.9 3.4 71 75    
Sweden 6.9 7.4 83 83 17 18 19 
United Kingdom 50.0 53.2 89 89 25 23 23 
United States 167.6 214.2 74 77 38 38 37 
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Appendix 2 Relationship between economic resources and social outcomes 
 
Table A2.1 Country ranking by per capita GNP and Human Development Index 
Gross national income per capita Human Development Index 
$ Rank Value Ranking 
 
1999 (a) 1999 1999 1999 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 370 170 0.470 132 
India 440 163 0.571 115 
Pakistan 470 160 0.498 127 
Sri Lanka 820 139 0.735 81 
East Asia 
China 780 142 0.718 87 
Rep of Korea 8490 54 0.875 27 
Southern Africa 
Botswana 3240 87 0.577 114 
Malawi 180 201 0.397 151 
Mozambique 220 195 0.323 157 
Namibia 1890 107 0.601 111 
South Africa 3170 88 0.702 94 
Zambia 330 175 0.427 143 
Zimbabwe 530 154 0.554 117 
OECD Countries 
Australia 20,950 27 0.936 2 
Canada 20,140 30 0.936 3 
Denmark 32,050 6 0.921 15 
France 24,170 21 0.924 13 
Germany 25,620 13 0.921 17 
Italy 20,170 29 0.909 20 
Norway 33,470 5 0.939 1 
Sweden 26,750 12 0.936 4 
United Kingdom 23,590 23 0.923 14 
United States 31,910 8 0.934 6 
 
a. Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method.  
 
Source: 2001 World Development Indicators, Human Development Report 2001. 
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Table A2.2 Countries with similar per capita GNP and diverging HDI ranks 
Country Per Capita GNP  
(1991 $US) 
HDI Rank 
Nepal 180 152 
Sierra Leone 210 172 
Sri Lanka 500 86 
Lesotho 580 120 
Philippines 730 92 
Cameroon 850 133 
Ecuador 1000 89 
Namibia 1460 135 
Costa Rica 1850 42 
Botswana 2530 104 
 
Source: World Development Report (1993) and Human Development Report (1993) 
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Table A2.4 RICE index and main explanatory variables 
Country RICE AID MINERAL QUALPOL POP-DENSE 
 (Dependent 
variable) 
(Aid as % 
GDP) 
(Mineral 
exports as % of 
GDP) 
(Quality of 
government 
institutions – 
scale 0–10) 
(Population 
density) 
Vietnam  0.23 2.0 0 4.5 545 
Sri Lanka  0.21 8.2 2 4.5 733 
Philippines  0.14 1.5 2 2.7 550 
Jamaica  0.14 7.4 7 4.5 630 
Honduras  0.12 6.5 2 3.5 116 
Kenya  0.12 8.7 0 6.1 104 
Paraguay  0.11 1.5 0 3.6 28 
Jordan 0.10 13.6 0 4.5 89 
Costa Rica  0.09 4.8 0 6.2 154 
India  0.08 0.9 2 5.8 769 
Trinidad/ 
Tobago  
0.08 0.1 23 5.2 680 
Peru  0.08 1.3 12 3.2 45 
Dominican Rep  0.08 2.7 4 4.4 393 
Malawi  0.08 16.8 0 4.9 229 
El Salvador  0.07 8.3 0 2.7 683 
Congo 
Brazzaville  
0.07 4.2 18 3.9 17 
Ecuador  0.07 1.1 13 4.9 98 
Zambia 0.07 11.0 9 4.0 27 
Tanzania  0.07 20.1 0 4.7 74 
Nigeria  0.06 0.6 15 3.1 272 
Indonesia  0.06 1.2 19 3.1 269 
Bolivia  0.06 7.6 14 2.0 16 
Uruguay  0.06 0.2 0 5.1 51 
Syrian Arab 
Rep.  
0.06 4.9 11 3.6 167 
Panama  0.05 1.0 0 3.7 87 
Malagasy  0.04 9.1 16 5.1 52 
Colombia  0.02 0.2 3 5.3 88 
Ethiopia  0.02 8.3 0 3.9 125 
Argentina  0.02 0.1 2 4.7 33 
Zimbabwe  0.02 4.3 7 4.8 64 
Mexico  0.01 0.1 3 4.7 117 
Thailand  0.01 1.1 3 5.7 298 
Ghana  0.00 6.2 0 3.7 166 
Chile  0.00 0.2 8 5.5 48 
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Cameroon 0.00 3.1 11 5.4 64 
Venezuela  -0.01 0.1 16 5.5 58 
Egypt  -0.01 5.2 14 4.7 139 
Tunisia  -0.01 20.1 10 4.5 139 
Brazil  -0.01 0.1 2 6.6 48 
Turkey  -0.01 0.5 2 5.2 194 
Pakistan  -0.03 2.7 0 4.3 373 
Haiti  -0.03 7.6 1 3.0 637 
Guatemala  -0.03 1.7 0 2.9 220 
Uganda  -0.05 8.9 0 3.1 214 
Papua  
N. Guinea 
-0.07 11.7 13 6.7 23 
Guinea-Bissau -0.07 45.9 0 3.1 94 
Malaysia  -0.07 0.6 10 7.3 143 
Morocco  -0.08 5.2 4 4.7 145 
Mali  -0.08 23.4 2 2.7 18 
Angola  -0.09 2.7 28 4.3 19 
Sierra Leone  -0.09 6.6 8 5.4 150 
Cote d’Ivoire  -0.11 2.8 1 6.5 93 
Gambia  -0.13 36.9 0 5.6 226 
Oman  -0.15 1.4 41 5.4 19 
Senegal  -0.16 14.4 0 4.9 99 
Saudi Arabia  -0.16 0.0 47 5.5 17 
Burkina Faso  -0.17 13.1 0 5.1 86 
Niger  -0.18 14.9 9 6.0 15 
Gabon  -0.21 2.1 41 5.3 9 
Guinea  -0.21 12.1 0 4.7 61 
Botswana  -0.23 7.6 48 6.9 6 
 
Source: Moore et al. 
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Table A2.5 Virtuous, vicious and lop-sided performance 1960–92 
 1960–70 1970–80 1980–92 
Africa 
Benin Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Botswana Vicious Virtuous Virtuous 
Burkina Faso Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Burundi Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Cameroon Vicious EG lop-sided Vicious 
Central Africa Republic Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Chad Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Congo Vicious EG lop-sided Vicious 
Cote d’Ivorie EG lop-sided Vicious Vicious 
Gabon EG lop-sided Vicious Vicious 
Ghana Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Kenya Vicious Virtuous Vicious 
Lesotho Virtuous EG lop-sided Vicious 
Madagascar Vicious HD lop-sided Vicious 
Malawi Vicious EG lop-sided Vicious 
Mali Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Mauritius HD lop-sided EG lop-sided EG lop-sided 
Niger Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Nigeria Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Rwanda Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Senegal Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Sierra Leone EG lop-sided Vicious Vicious 
South Africa Virtuous Vicious Vicious 
Sudan Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Tanzania Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Zaire Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Zimbabwe Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Latin America 
Argentina Vicious Vicious HD lop-sided 
Barbados Virtuous HD lop-sided HD lop-sided 
Bolivia Vicious Vicious HD lop-sided 
Brazil EG lop-sided EG lop-sided Vicious 
Chile HD lop-sided HD lop-sided Virtuous 
Colombia HD lop-sided Virtuous HD lop-sided 
Costa Rica HD lop-sided HD lop-sided HD lop-sided 
Dominican Republic HD lop-sided EG lop-sided Vicious 
El Salvador HD lop-sided Vicious HD lop-sided 
Guatemala HD lop-sided EG lop-sided Vicious 
Haiti Vicious Vicious Vicious 
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Honduras Vicious HD lop-sided HD lop-sided 
Jamaica Virtuous Vicious Vicious 
Mexico Virtuous Virtuous HD lop-sided 
Nicaragua Virtuous Vicious HD lop-sided 
Panama Virtuous Virtuous HD lop-sided 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Paraguay Vicious EG lop-sided Vicious 
Peru HD lop-sided Vicious HD lop-sided 
Togo EG lop-sided Vicious Vicious 
Trinidad & Tobago Vicious EG lop-sided HD lop-sided 
Uruguay Vicious Vicious HD lop-sided 
Venezuela HD lop-sided HD lop-sided Vicious 
South Asia 
India Vicious Vicious EG lop-sided 
Nepal Vicious Vicious Vicious 
Pakistan EG lop-sided Vicious EG lop-sided 
Sri Lanka Vicious EG lop-sided Virtuous 
Bangladesh Vicious Vicious Vicious 
East Asia 
China HD lop-sided Virtuous Virtuous 
Hong Kong Virtuous Virtuous Virtuous 
Indonesia HD lop-sided Virtuous Virtuous 
Korea Republic Virtuous Virtuous Virtuous 
Malaysia Virtuous Virtuous Virtuous 
Myanmar HD lop-sided Vicious Vicious 
Philippines HD lop-sided EG lop-sided Vicious 
Singapore Virtuous Virtuous Virtuous 
Thailand Virtuous Virtuous Virtuous 
Middle East 
Algeria Vicious HD lop-sided HD lop-sided 
Egypt EG lop-sided EG lop-sided Vicious 
Morocco Vicious EG lop-sided HD lop-sided 
Turkey Virtuous HD lop-sided HD lop-sided 
 
Source: Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez  
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Appendix 3 Explanation of components making up the Commitment to 
Development Index  
 
Aid: the index measures not only the percentage of GNP disbursed as foreign assistance but also the 
extent to which it is “tied” to the purchase of goods and services from donor countries. In 2001 alone, 
2/5 of total international aid flows were tied. 
 
Trade: the index measures the extent to which rich countries operate barriers to developing-country 
exports and income foregone by poor countries due to internal production subsidies in rich countries 
 
Environment: rich countries have special responsibilities for global environment stewardship, not only 
because they have contributed disproportionately to its degradation and because any effects of climatic 
change hurts poorer countries disproportionately 
 
Investment: the index prioritises foreign direct investment over short-term capital flows as more likely to 
bring jobs and growth but penalises rich countries whose corporations have been identified as engaging in 
corrupt practices overseas to conduct their business. 
 
Migration: while migration flows can hurt in some ways and help in others, on balance, the Index treats 
the free movement of people as beneficial both in terms of improving wage rates in labour-surplus 
economies and contributing to remittance flows into poorer countries. 
 
Peacekeeping: the index rewards countries for financial and personnel contributions to multi-lateral 
peacekeeping operations. The inclusion of peacekeeping reflects the belief that domestic stability and 
freedom from attack are prerequisites for economic development. There are other ways in which rich 
countries can contribute to world stability, but recognising that one nation’s security enhancement may be 
another’s destabilizing intervention (as illustrated by the debate over Iraq), the Index confines itself to the 
measurement of peacekeeping contributions (From Birdsall and Roodman 2003)  
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